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Consistency in Organization

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart

Abstract

Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This perspective has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended to organization theory. The idea is developed by starting from Williamson's discussion of idiosyncratic exchange. The perspective sheds new light on several topics in the theory of the firm, like the boundaries of the firm (“Williamson's puzzle”), the importance of fairness concerns within firms, the attenuation of incentives, or the role of routines. It implies a “perceptional” theory of the firm that is “realistic” in the sense advocated by Coase (1937).

Suggested Citation

  • Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2008. "Consistency in Organization," Discussion Papers in Economics 6569, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:6569
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. James Rycroft & John M. Luiz, 2018. "Homelessness, Property Rights, and Institutional Logics," Working Papers 750, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    3. Aidan Walsh, 2011. "Learning from pondlife and fishermen: towards a modular financial services industry," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 19(4), pages 312-322, November.
    4. Stefano Zamagni, 2013. "Cooperative entrepreneurship," Chapters, in: Luigino Bruni & Stefano Zamagni (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise, chapter 9, pages 94-107, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Chris Garbers & Guangling Dave Liu, 2017. "Macroprudential policy and foreign interest rate shocks: A comparison of different instruments and regulatory regimes," Working Papers 719, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    6. Zamagni, Stefano, 2005. "Per una teoria economico-civile dell'impresa cooperativa," AICCON Working Papers 10-2005, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    theory of the firm; hierarchy; evolutionary theory of the firm; perceptional theory of the firm; consistency; small numbers; centralization paradox; Williamson's puzzle; compensation; boundaries of the firm; fairness; small numbers; idiosyncratic exchange; entitlements; obligations; routines; framing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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