The Homo Economicus Under Experimental Attack
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More about this item
Keywords
behavioral economics; rational choice; evolutionary economics; anomalies; bounded rationality; institutional economics; norm erosion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
- B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
- B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2021-01-11 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2021-01-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HME-2021-01-11 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-HPE-2021-01-11 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2021-01-11 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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