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The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China

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  • Otto, Ilona M.
  • Wechsung, Frank

Abstract

In our field experiment carried out with stakeholders from the Chinese Haihe River Basin, a group of five players located along an irrigation channel first decide on the amount they would invest in a public fund for channel maintenance. In the next step, they choose the amount of water to withdraw from the channel to irrigate their plots of land. We compare the effects of different rules of water distribution and communication on three types of group participants: farmers, water administrators and students.

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  • Otto, Ilona M. & Wechsung, Frank, 2014. "The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 10-20.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:99:y:2014:i:c:p:10-20
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.12.007
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    1. Robert Roßner & Dimitrios Zikos, 2018. "The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-30, July.
    2. Kwabena A. Owusu & Micaela M. Kulesz & Agostino Merico, 2019. "Extraction Behaviour and Income Inequalities Resulting from a Common Pool Resource Exploitation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-13, January.
    3. Tanja Baerlein & Ulan Kasymov & Dimitrios Zikos, 2015. "Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, January.
    4. Gebretsadik, Kidanemariam Abreha, 2019. "Irrigation Water Scarcity and Antisocial Behavior: Experimental Evidence from Communal Irrigation Water," Working Paper Series 5-2019, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, School of Economics and Business.
    5. Ana Alicia Dipierri & Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-21, December.
    6. Yubing Fan & Zeng Tang & Seong C. Park, 2019. "Effects of Community Perceptions and Institutional Capacity on Smallholder Farmers’ Responses to Water Scarcity: Evidence from Arid Northwestern China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-21, January.
    7. Kasymov, Ulan & Wang, Xiaoxi & Zikos, Dimitrios & Chopan, Massih & Ibele, Benedikt, 2022. "Institutional Barriers to Sustainable Forest Management: Evidence from an Experimental Study in Tajikistan," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    8. Amirova, Iroda & Petrick, Martin & Djanibekov, Nodir, 2022. "Investment traps and resilience to shocks: An experimental study of Central Asian collective water governance," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 71(S1), pages 110-123.
    9. Lan T. Pham & Ilona M. Otto & Dimitrios Zikos, 2019. "Self-Governance and the Effects of Rules in Irrigation Systems: Evidence from Laboratory and Framed Field Experiments in China, India and Vietnam," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-28, January.

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