IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/asiapa/v41y2024i4d10.1007_s10490-023-09902-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Board political connections and financial fraud: The case of business groups in South Korea

Author

Listed:
  • Dong Shin Kim

    (The University of North Georgia)

  • Seung-Hyun Lee

    (The University of Texas at Dallas)

Abstract

Are business groups more likely to commit financial fraud when they are politically connected? Many past studies and anecdotal evidence have pointed out that business groups may behave more opportunistically when they are politically connected. However, the nature of the business group-government relationship evolves amid governance reform in many countries, making it difficult for business groups to abuse their political connections. In this research, we examine the business group-government relationship through the lens of social exchange and find a deterring effect of political connections on a connected business group’s propensity to commit fraud. Our results indicate that business groups are less likely to commit financial fraud when the extent of their political connection is high. By doing so, politically connected firms can prove themselves as legitimate business partners for the government and can more effectively secure a position to leverage their political connections. We additionally find that such an exchange relationship is weakened under a business group-unfriendly government due to their hostile relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong Shin Kim & Seung-Hyun Lee, 2024. "Board political connections and financial fraud: The case of business groups in South Korea," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 2119-2153, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:asiapa:v:41:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10490-023-09902-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10490-023-09902-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10490-023-09902-8
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10490-023-09902-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cynthia E. Devers & Todd Dewett & Yuri Mishina & Carrie A. Belsito, 2009. "A General Theory of Organizational Stigma," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 154-171, February.
    2. Michelle L. Zorn & Christine Shropshire & John A. Martin & James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen Jr., 2017. "Home Alone: The Effects of Lone-Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(13), pages 2623-2646, December.
    3. Chaney, Paul K. & Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David, 2011. "The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 58-76, February.
    4. Chad Albrecht & Chad Turnbull & Yingying Zhang & Christopher J. Skousen, 2010. "The relationship between South Korean chaebols and fraud," Management Research Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 33(3), pages 257-268, March.
    5. Kyeong Hun Lee, 2018. "Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions amid political uncertainty: A bargaining perspective," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(11), pages 2992-3005, November.
    6. Shane A. Johnson & Harley E. Ryan & Yisong S. Tian, 2009. "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 115-145.
    7. Seung‐Hyun Lee & Mona Makhija, 2009. "Flexibility in internationalization: is it valuable during an economic crisis?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(5), pages 537-555, May.
    8. Jiandong Chen & Douglas Cumming & Wenxuan Hou & Edward Lee, 2016. "Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 727-742, April.
    9. Jidong Chen & Jennifer Pan & Yiqing Xu, 2016. "Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(2), pages 383-400, April.
    10. E. Han Kim & Woochan Kim, 2008. "Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to Crisis," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 20(1), pages 47-58, December.
    11. Jared Harris & Philip Bromiley, 2007. "Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 350-367, June.
    12. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R, 2001. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 179-198, April.
    13. Marie Rama, 2012. "Corporate Governance and Corruption: Ethical Dilemmas of Asian Business Groups," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 109(4), pages 501-519, September.
    14. Diana C. Robertson & Erin Anderson, 1993. "Control System and Task Environment Effects on Ethical Judgment: An Exploratory Study of Industrial Salespeople," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(4), pages 617-644, November.
    15. Wei Shi & Brian L. Connelly & Robert E. Hoskisson, 2017. "External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(6), pages 1268-1286, June.
    16. Michael Berlemann & Sören Enkelmann & Torben Kuhlenkasper, 2015. "Unraveling the Relationship Between Presidential Approval and the Economy: A Multidimensional Semiparametric Approach," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 468-486, April.
    17. Black, Bernard & Kim, Woochan, 2012. "The effect of board structure on firm value: A multiple identification strategies approach using Korean data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 203-226.
    18. Seung-Hyun Lee & Hee Jin Mun & Kyung Min Park, 2015. "When is dependence on other organizations burdensome? The effect of asymmetric dependence on internet firm failure," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(13), pages 2058-2074, December.
    19. Brandice Canes‐Wrone & Kenneth W. Shotts, 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 690-706, October.
    20. Amy J. Hillman & Asghar Zardkoohi & Leonard Bierman, 1999. "Corporate political strategies and firm performance: indications of firm‐specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 67-81, January.
    21. Ducret, Romain & Isakov, Dušan, 2020. "The Korea discount and chaebols," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    22. Yu, Frank & Yu, Xiaoyun, 2011. "Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(6), pages 1865-1891, December.
    23. Park, Choelsoon & Kim, Seonghoon, 2008. "Corporate governance, regulatory changes, and corporate restructuring in Korea, 1993-2004," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 66-84, January.
    24. Correia, Maria M., 2014. "Political connections and SEC enforcement," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 241-262.
    25. Abhinav Gupta & Forrest Briscoe & Donald C. Hambrick, 2017. "Red, blue, and purple firms: Organizational political ideology and corporate social responsibility," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(5), pages 1018-1040, May.
    26. Iacus, Stefano & King, Gary & Porro, Giuseppe, 2009. "cem: Software for Coarsened Exact Matching," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 30(i09).
    27. Matthew Blackwell & Stefano Iacus & Gary King & Giuseppe Porro, 2009. "cem: Coarsened exact matching in Stata," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 9(4), pages 524-546, December.
    28. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    29. Marleen Dieleman & Wladimir M. Sachs, 2008. "Coevolution of Institutions and Corporations in Emerging Economies: How the Salim Group Morphed into an Institution of Suharto's Crony Regime," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(7), pages 1274-1300, November.
    30. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006. "Who cares about corruption?," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 37(6), pages 807-822, November.
    31. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2003. "Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 27(4), pages 367-382, October.
    32. Byung S. Min & Amon Chizema, 2018. "Board Meeting Attendance by Outside Directors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 147(4), pages 901-917, February.
    33. Fich, Eliezer M. & Shivdasani, Anil, 2007. "Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 306-336, November.
    34. repec:cup:jfinqa:v:46:y:2011:i:06:p:1865-1891_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    35. Alexander Dyck & Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, 2010. "Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2213-2253, December.
    36. Chanhoo Song & Seung Hun Han, 2017. "Stock Market Reaction to Corporate Crime: Evidence from South Korea," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 143(2), pages 323-351, June.
    37. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    38. Kurt A. Desender & Ruth V. Aguilera & Mónica Lópezpuertas-Lamy & Rafel Crespi, 2016. "A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 349-369, February.
    39. Toby Stuart & Yanbo Wang, 2016. "Who cooks the books in China, and does it pay? Evidence from private, high‐technology firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(13), pages 2658-2676, December.
    40. Amon Chizema & Jootae Kim, 2010. "Outside Directors on Korean Boards: Governance and Institutions," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 109-129, January.
    41. Almeida, Heitor & Park, Sang Yong & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2011. "The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 447-475, February.
    42. Ishtiaq P. Mahmood & Hongjin Zhu & Akbar Zaheer, 2017. "Centralization of intragroup equity ties and performance of business group affiliates," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(5), pages 1082-1100, May.
    43. Dongmin Kong & Junyi Xiang & Jian Zhang & Yiyang Lu, 2019. "Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(5), pages 1347-1383, March.
    44. Vikramaditya Khanna & E. Han Kim & Yao Lu, 2015. "CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(3), pages 1203-1252, June.
    45. Sviatoslav Moskalev & Seung Park, 2010. "South Korean Chaebols and Value-Based Management," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 49-62, March.
    46. Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, March.
    47. Yujin Jeong & Jordan I. Siegel, 2018. "Threat of falling high status and corporate bribery: Evidence from the revealed accounting records of two South Korean presidents," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 1083-1111, April.
    48. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
    49. Barker, Roger M., 2010. "Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties: Explaining Corporate Governance Change in Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199576814.
    50. Douglas A. Schuler & Wei Shi & Robert E. Hoskisson & Tao Chen, 2017. "Windfalls of emperors' sojourns: Stock market reactions to Chinese firms hosting high-ranking government officials," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(8), pages 1668-1687, August.
    51. John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, 2006. "The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform," Politics & Society, , vol. 34(4), pages 463-502, December.
    52. Chang Liu & Chune Young Chung & Hong Kee Sul & Kainan Wang, 2018. "Does hometown advantage matter? The case of institutional blockholder monitoring on earnings management in Korea," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 49(2), pages 196-221, February.
    53. Tracy Yue Wang, 2013. "Corporate Securities Fraud: Insights from a New Empirical Framework," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(3), pages 535-568, June.
    54. Poirier, Dale J., 1980. "Partial observability in bivariate probit models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 209-217, February.
    55. Glenn Hoetker, 2007. "The use of logit and probit models in strategic management research: Critical issues," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 331-343, April.
    56. Seung‐Rok Park & Ky‐hyang Yuhn, 2012. "Has the Koreanchaebolmodel succeeded?," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 39(2), pages 260-274, May.
    57. Seung‐Rok Park & Ky‐hyang Yuhn, 2012. "Has the Koreanchaebolmodel succeeded?," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 39(2), pages 260-274, May.
    58. Wenfeng Wu & Sofia A. Johan & Oliver M. Rui, 2016. "Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 709-726, April.
    59. Hicheon Kim & Robert E. Hoskisson & Laszlo Tihanyi & Jaebum Hong, 2004. "The Evolution and Restructuring of Diversified Business Groups in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from Chaebols in Korea," Chapters, in: Sung-Hee Jwa & In K. Lee (ed.), Competition and Corporate Governance in Korea, chapter 8, pages 219-248, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    60. Kim, Haksoon & Lim, Chanwoo, 2010. "Diversity, outside directors and firm valuation: Korean evidence," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 284-291, March.
    61. Chang,Sea-Jin, 2003. "Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521814355, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jian Zhang, 2018. "Public Governance and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Recent Anti-corruption Campaign in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 148(2), pages 375-396, March.
    2. Dongmin Kong & Junyi Xiang & Jian Zhang & Yiyang Lu, 2019. "Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(5), pages 1347-1383, March.
    3. Abdul Ghafoor & Rozaimah Zainudin & Nurul Shahnaz Mahdzan, 2019. "Factors Eliciting Corporate Fraud in Emerging Markets: Case of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions in Malaysia," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 587-608, December.
    4. Xiong, Jiacai & Ouyang, Caiyue & Tong, Jamie Yixing & Zhang, Feida Frank, 2021. "Fraud commitment in a smaller world: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    5. Habib, Ahsan & Ranasinghe, Dinithi & Muhammadi, Abdul Haris & Islam, Ainul, 2018. "Political connections, financial reporting and auditing: Survey of the empirical literature," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 37-51.
    6. Hou, Xiaohui & Wang, Tengyu & Ma, Caoyuan, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty and corporate fraud," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 97-110.
    7. Yusi Jiang & Tianyu Gong & Wan Cheng & Yapu Zhao, 2023. "Repression or indulgence? Distinctive government influence on firm financial and environmental misconduct in China," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(1), pages 379-402, February.
    8. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    9. Kuang, Yu Flora & Lee, Gladys, 2017. "Corporate fraud and external social connectedness of independent directors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 401-427.
    10. Zhang, Jian & Wang, Jialong & Kong, Dongmin, 2020. "Employee treatment and corporate fraud," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 325-334.
    11. Jiamin Wang & Qian Li & Chenmeng Lai & Victor Song, 2024. "Corporate fraud, political connections, and media bias: Evidence from China," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 319-353, April.
    12. Correia, Maria M., 2014. "Political connections and SEC enforcement," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 241-262.
    13. Yik-Pui Low, Steven & Foo, Yee-Boon & Gul, Ferdinand A, 2023. "Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1).
    14. Cole, Rebel & Johan, Sofia & Schweizer, Denis, 2021. "Corporate failures: Declines, collapses, and scandals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    15. Kuvvet, Emre & Maskara, Pankaj Kumar, 2018. "Former members of the U.S. Congress and fraud enforcement: Does it help to have politically connected friends on the board?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 77-89.
    16. Rind, Asad Ali & Abbassi, Wajih & Allaya, Manel & Hammouda, Amira, 2022. "Local peers and firm misconduct: The role of sustainability and competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    17. Chen, Yunyan & Wu, Shinong & Zhou, Yucheng & Huo, Di, 2023. "Gambling culture and corporate violations: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    18. Elvira Sojli & Wing Wah Tham, 2017. "Foreign political connections," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 48(2), pages 244-266, February.
    19. Wang, Yang & Ashton, John K. & Jaafar, Aziz, 2019. "Does mutual fund investment influence accounting fraud?," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 142-158.
    20. Zhong, Xi & Ren, Liuyang & Song, Tiebo, 2021. "Different effects of internal and external tournament incentives on corporate financial misconduct: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 329-341.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:asiapa:v:41:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10490-023-09902-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.