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Private Prerogative, Public Purpose: Political Entrepreneurship and Management in Frederick the Great’s Anti-Machiavel

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  • Alexander W. Salter

    (Texas Tech University)

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  • Alexander W. Salter, 2020. "Private Prerogative, Public Purpose: Political Entrepreneurship and Management in Frederick the Great’s Anti-Machiavel," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Spring 20), pages 1-28.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1651
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cameralism; enlightened absolutism; entrepreneurship; Frederick the Great; political entrepreneurship; public administration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B11 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Preclassical (Ancient, Medieval, Mercantilist, Physiocratic)
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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