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The Allocation and Exchange of Property Rights as a Way to Understand Comparative Economic Systems and Managerial Economics

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  • John Garen

    (University of Kentucky)

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Suggested Citation

  • John Garen, 2020. "The Allocation and Exchange of Property Rights as a Way to Understand Comparative Economic Systems and Managerial Economics," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Winter 20), pages 43-59.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1738
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Dragos Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2014. "Crony Capitalism: Rent Seeking, Institutions and Ideology," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 156-176, May.
    2. Wimmer, Bradley S & Garen, John E, 1997. "Moral Hazard, Asset Specificity, Implicit Bonding, and Compensation: The Case of Franchising," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 544-554, July.
    3. Daniel L. Bennett & Hugo J. Faria & James D. Gwartney & Daniel R. Morales, 2016. "Evaluating Alternative Measures of Institutional Protection of Private Property and Their Relative Ability to Predict Economic Development," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 57-78.
    4. Alexander William Salter, 2016. "Political Property Rights and Governance Outcomes: A Theory of the Corporate Polity," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 1-20.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    6. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-233, April.
    7. Claudia R. Williamson, 2017. "Praise for Property," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 32(Winter 20), pages 83-94.
    8. Paul Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2012. "State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 357-379, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Garen, 2023. "Enhancing economic freedom via school choice and competition: Have state laws been enabling enough to generate broad‐based effects?," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 82(4), pages 289-312, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; comparative systems; business organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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