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—Biased but Efficient: An Investigation of Coordination Facilitated by Asymmetric Dominance

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  • Wilfred Amaldoss

    (The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708)

  • James R. Bettman

    (The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708)

  • John W. Payne

    (The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708)

Abstract

In several marketing contexts, strategic complementarity between the actions of individual players demands that players coordinate their decisions to reach efficient outcomes. Yet coordination failure is a common occurrence. We show that the well-established psychological phenomenon of asymmetric dominance can facilitate coordination in two experiments. Thus, we demonstrate a counterintuitive result: A common bias in individual decision making can help players to coordinate their decisions to obtain efficient outcomes. Further, limited steps of thinking alone cannot account for the observed asymmetric dominance effect. The effect appears to be due to increased psychological attractiveness of the dominating strategy, with our estimates of the incremental attractiveness ranging from 3%–6%. A learning analysis further clarifies that asymmetric dominance and adaptive learning can guide players to an efficient outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilfred Amaldoss & James R. Bettman & John W. Payne, 2008. "—Biased but Efficient: An Investigation of Coordination Facilitated by Asymmetric Dominance," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(5), pages 903-921, 09-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:27:y:2008:i:5:p:903-921
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0352
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Ayala Arad & Benjamin Bachi & Amnon Maltz, 2023. "On the relevance of irrelevant strategies," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1142-1184, November.
    4. Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, 2013. "When Do Markets Tip? A Cognitive Hierarchy Approach," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 431-453, May.
    5. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 2012. "Measuring risk aversion with lists: A new bias," Working Papers 88, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Yuxin Chen & Ganesh Iyer & Amit Pazgal, 2010. "Limited Memory, Categorization, and Competition," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 650-670, 07-08.
    7. Chong, Juin-Kuan & Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin, 2016. "A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 257-274.
    8. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 2012. "Measuring risk aversion with lists: A new bias," Working Papers 239, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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