Patent Licensing in Vertically Disaggregated Industries: The Royalty Allocation Neutrality Principle
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Cited by:
- Llobet, Gerard & Neven, Damien, 2022.
"Investment and Patent Licensing in the Value Chain,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
17405, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gerard Llobet & Damien Neven, 2022. "Investment and Patent Licensing in the Value Chain," IHEID Working Papers 30-2022, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
- Olena Ivus & Edwin L.‐C. Lai & Ted Sichelman, 2020.
"An economic model of patent exhaustion,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 816-833, October.
- Olena Ivus & Edwin L.-C. Lai & Ted Sichelman, 2017. "An Economic Model of Patent Exhaustion," CESifo Working Paper Series 6638, CESifo.
- Gregor Langus & Vilen Lipatov, 2022. "Efficient Level of SEPs Licensing," CESifo Working Paper Series 9574, CESifo.
- Rossi, Maria Alessandra, 2022. "The advent of 5G and the non-discrimination principle," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(4).
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More about this item
Keywords
patent licensing; patent exhaustion; vertical relationships.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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