IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cir/cirwor/96s-08.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Upstream Downstream Specialization by Integrated Firms in a Partially Integrated Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Gérard Gaudet
  • Ngo Van Long
  • Antoine Soubeyran

Abstract

We propose a simple model of a partially integrated industry which explicitly takes into account persistent production cost differences across upstream firms, such as one might observe in natural resource industries. The model allows us to highlight the respective roles of strategic considerations in the determination of an integrated firm's interaction with the non-integrated sector of the industry and, in the end, on its relative upstream-downstream specialization. Stylized facts from the world oil industry are used to illustrate the type of behaviour one might expect in this context. On s'intéresse à la détermination du degré de spécialisation amont-aval d'une industrie partiellement intégrée. La situation est modélisée de sorte à pouvoir prendre en compte des différences persistantes de coût de production entre firmes en amont, ce qui est typique de plusieurs industries de ressources naturelles. Le modèle permet de faire ressortir les rôles respectifs des considérations stratégiques et des considérations de coût dans la détermination de l'interaction d'une firme intégrée avec le secteur non intégré de l'industrie et, de ce fait, la détermination de sa spécialisation relative amont-aval. Des faits stylisés tirés de l'industrie pétrolière mondiale viennent illustrer le type de comportement auquel on peut s'attendre dans un tel contexte.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1996. "Upstream Downstream Specialization by Integrated Firms in a Partially Integrated Industry," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-08, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:96s-08
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/96s-08.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
    2. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    3. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
    4. Gaudet, Gerard & Long, Ngo Van, 1994. "On the effects of the distribution of initial endowments in a nonrenewable resource duopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 1189-1198, November.
    5. Adelman, M. A., 1991. "User cost in oil production," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 217-240, September.
    6. Perry, Martin K., 1989. "Vertical integration: Determinants and effects," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 183-255, Elsevier.
    7. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    8. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, September.
    9. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
    10. Johnsen, D Bruce, 1991. "Property Rights to Cartel Rents: The Socony-Vacuum Story," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 177-203, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ioannis N. Pinopoulos, 2017. "Upstream horizontal mergers and vertical integration," Discussion Paper Series 2017_07, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Aug 2017.
    2. Ivan Dufeu, 2004. "Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies," Working Papers hal-00581571, HAL.
    3. Singer, Marcos & Donoso, Patricio, 2008. "Upstream or downstream in the value chain?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 61(6), pages 669-677, June.
    4. Arunanondchai, May, 2001. "Can Indonesia Gain from Log Export Barriers?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 619, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Rodrigo Barraza & Juan M. Sepúlveda & Ivan Derpich, 2022. "Location of the Intermediate Echelon to Add Purchase Value and Sustainability Criteria in a Mining Supply Network," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-14, October.
    6. Arunanondchai, May, 2002. "Can Indonesia Gain from Log Export Barriers?," Economic Research Papers 269389, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    2. Abiru, Masahiro & Nahata, Babu & Raychaudhuri, Subhashis & Waterson, Michael, 1998. "Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 463-480, December.
    3. Lynne Pepall & George Norman, 2001. "Product Differentiation and Upstream‐Downstream Relations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 201-233, June.
    4. Laurent Linnemer, 2000. "When Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm Improves Welfare," Working Papers 2000-42, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    5. Roberto Hernán González & Praveen Kujal, 2012. "Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, April.
    6. Leonardo Medrano, 1999. "Market Foreclosure and Strategic Aspects of Vertical Agreements," Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, CIDE, División de Economía, vol. 0(1), pages 91-104, January-J.
    7. Bruno Larue & Olivier Bonroy, 2009. "Seemingly Competitive Food Retail Regulations: Who Do They Really Help?," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 57(3), pages 305-324, September.
    8. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," SOI - Working Papers 0212, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    9. Upender Subramanian & Jagmohan S. Raju & Z. John Zhang, 2013. "Exclusive Handset Arrangements in the Wireless Industry: A Competitive Analysis," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 246-270, March.
    10. José Carlos Ramírez, 1999. "Los nuevos factores de localización industrial en México. La experiencia de los complejos automotrices de exportación en el norte," Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, CIDE, División de Economía, vol. 0(1), pages 105-147, January-J.
    11. George Norman & Lynne Pepall, 1998. "Product Competition and Upstream Flexible Specialization," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9818, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    12. Zanaj Skerdilajda, 2010. "Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, November.
    13. Javier D. Donna & Pedro Pereira, 2024. "Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 303-345, August.
    14. Bourreau, Marc & Hombert, Johan & Pouyet, Jerome & Schutz, Nicolas, 2007. "Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0703, CEPREMAP.
    15. Maija Halonen, 1994. "Endogenous Industry Structure in Vertical Duopoly," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 07, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    16. Lin, Ping, 2006. "Strategic spin-offs of input divisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 977-993, May.
    17. Mattoo, Aaditya, 1999. "Can no antitrust policy be better than some antitrust policy?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2191, The World Bank.
    18. Zanchettin, Piercarlo & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2017. "Vertical integration and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 25-57.
    19. Inderst, Roman & Valletti, Tommaso, 2011. "Incentives for input foreclosure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 820-831, August.
    20. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2004. "Intimidating Competitors � Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive Oligopoly," SOI - Working Papers 0409, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2005.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Integrated Firms; Specialization; Strategic Interactions; Firmes intégrées; spécialisation; interactions stratégiques;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:96s-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciranca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.