IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvec/2006024.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Upstream market foreclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Jean j., GABSZEWICZ

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • Skerdilajda, ZANAJ

Abstract

This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolistic can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyze two polar cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being supplied inelastically. We show that the situation opens the door to entry deterrence. Then, we assume that the input is supplied by a single seller who chooses the input price. In this case we show that entry deterrence can be reached only through merger with the seller of the input.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean j., GABSZEWICZ & Skerdilajda, ZANAJ, 2006. "Upstream market foreclosure," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006024, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2006-24.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    2. Jean Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Tanguy Ypersele & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2013. "Market Games in Successive Oligopolies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(3), pages 397-410, June.
    3. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    4. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
    5. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
    6. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September.
    7. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    8. Granitz, Elizabeth & Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-47, April.
    9. Martin, Stephen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M, 2001. "Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 466-496, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andre Jungmittag, 2018. "The Direct and Indirect Effects of Product Market Regulations in the Retail Trade Sector," JRC Research Reports JRC112222, Joint Research Centre.
    2. SANIN, Maria Eugenia & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "Environmental innovation under Cournot competition," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Éric Avenel & Clémence Christin, 2011. "Equilibrium strategic overbuying," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201205, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    4. Olivier Chatain, 2014. "How do strategic factor markets respond to rivalry in the product market?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(13), pages 1952-1971, December.
    5. repec:lic:licosd:31112 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roberto Hernán González & Praveen Kujal, 2012. "Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, April.
    2. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    3. Karbowski, Adam, 2019. "Greed and fear in downstream R&D games," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 32, pages 63-76.
    4. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Simshauser, Paul & Tian, Yuan & Whish-Wilson, Patrick, 2015. "Vertical integration in energy-only electricity markets," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 35-56.
    6. Roy, Santanu & Viaene, Jean-Marie, 1998. "On strategic vertical foreign investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 253-279, December.
    7. Mandy, David M. & Mayo, John W. & Sappington, David E.M., 2016. "Targeting efforts to raise rivals' costs: Moving from “Whether” to “Whom”," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-15.
    8. Bruno Larue & Olivier Bonroy, 2009. "Seemingly Competitive Food Retail Regulations: Who Do They Really Help?," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 57(3), pages 305-324, September.
    9. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and industrial organization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 511-517.
    10. Felipe Balmaceda & Eduardo Saavedra, 2005. "Integración Vertical Eficiente y Compartimiento de Facilidades en Presencia de Entrada: Un Marco Conceptual," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv168, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    11. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," SOI - Working Papers 0212, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    12. Upender Subramanian & Jagmohan S. Raju & Z. John Zhang, 2013. "Exclusive Handset Arrangements in the Wireless Industry: A Competitive Analysis," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 246-270, March.
    13. Cooper, James C. & Froeb, Luke M. & O'Brien, Dan & Vita, Michael G., 2005. "Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 639-664, September.
    14. Martin Peitz & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "- Exclusive Dealing Clauses Facilitate Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    15. Caillaud, Bernard & Rey, Patrick, 1995. "Strategic aspects of vertical delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 421-431, April.
    16. Allain, Marie-Laure & Chambolle, Claire & Rey, Patrick & Teyssier, Sabrina, 2021. "Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    17. Felipe Balmaceda & Eduardo Saavedra, 2007. "Vertical Integration And Shared Facilities In Unregulated Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 771-772, December.
    18. Choi, J.P. & Yi, S.S., 1997. "Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications," Other publications TiSEM db1a85b2-f6d1-42ce-be73-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
    20. Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Upstream-Downstream Specialization by Integrated Firms in a Partially Integrated Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 14(4), pages 321-335, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entry deterrence; Foreclosure; Overinvestment; Bilateral monopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Virginie LEBLANC (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iruclbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.