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Developing a Construction Safety Standard System to Enhance Safety Supervision Efficiency in China: A Theoretical Simulation of the Evolutionary Game Process

Author

Listed:
  • Wenxin Su

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Xin Gao

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Yukun Jiang

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Jinrong Li

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

Labor safety is one of the most fundamental indicators to improve contractors’ sustainability. Safety supervision plays a crucial role in affecting the safety performance of infrastructure projects. However, studies of standards development to enhance safety supervision efficiency are far from complete. Safety standards define safe behaviors for construction workers and hazard control processes in the workplace, and they are usually considered as an important part of safety control. In addition, the systematic reform of construction safety standards in China provides an innovative perspective to enhance safety supervision efficiency by linking standards to supervision. For this purpose, this paper proposes the concept and framework of the “Construction Safety Standard System (CSSS)” through expert interviews. CSSS hierarchically classifies safety standards and integrates similar standards. Its implementation will significantly influence the behavioral decisions of safety supervision stakeholders. Evolutionary game (EG) theory is applied to demonstrate the decision-making procedure in CSSS establishment and application. Furthermore, system dynamics (SD) is utilized to model and analyze equilibrium states under different supervision strategies. Meanwhile, case studies are implemented to assess the CSSS’s effectiveness in reality. The numerical results indicate that through CSSS implementation, the strategy choice fluctuation of supervisors and contractors is suppressed and a more desirable stable equilibrium is reached. The government tends to supervise and contractors tend to obey safety standards consciously. The findings reveal that CSSS can enhance safety supervision efficiency and have meaningful implications for theoretical study on safety supervision and construction safety management practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenxin Su & Xin Gao & Yukun Jiang & Jinrong Li, 2021. "Developing a Construction Safety Standard System to Enhance Safety Supervision Efficiency in China: A Theoretical Simulation of the Evolutionary Game Process," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(23), pages 1-22, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:23:p:13364-:d:693727
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    References listed on IDEAS

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