Unraveling the intricacies of panic buying: An evolutionary game-theoretic exploration of the evolution and intervention

Panic buying caused by emergencies can lead to supply and demand imbalances, price fluctuations, and even social unrest. This research explores the evolution of this intricate phenomenon and possible intervention measures from an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective. A novel social learning (SL) mechanism is conceptualized first to reveal its impact on the generation and propagation of the panic buying. Then, a tripartite evolutionary game model further investigates its evolution and assesses the effects of intervention measures, considering the influence of merchants' and governments' actions on the consumers' purchasing behaviors. The results show that: (1) While the SL intensity rises, the initial willingness threshold that sets off the widespread panic buying behavior will decrease. In other words, the consumers are more susceptible to panic buying. (2) The rationing policy implemented by merchants can effectively reduce the mass panic buying when the consumers' initial panic buying willingness is low. However, as the initial willingness increases, the positive effect of ration gradually weakens, or even gets ineffective. In this case, reducing the SL impacts is a critical supplementary measure for mitigating panic buying. (3) The governments could reduce panic buying through their intervention with the merchants' actions. This study demonstrates that the governments' dynamic intervention mechanisms are superior to the static one in mitigating panic buying. Particularly, a combination of dynamic penalty and static subsidy imposed on merchants is most effective for deterring them from inflating price and further mitigating consumers' panic purchase.