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An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory

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  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    (Stockholm University)

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  • Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0347
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull & Ken Binmore, 1996. "Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results," International Economic Association Series, in: Beth Allen (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, chapter 4, pages 90-117, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. ZHOU, Chaohong & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory," Working Papers 2009002, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    3. Banerjee, A. & Weibull, J.W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1637, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    4. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1996. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 558-573, November.
    5. ZHOU, Chaohong & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory," ACED Working Papers 2009001, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    6. Choudhury, Kangkan Dev & Aydinyan, Tigran, 2023. "Stochastic replicator dynamics: A theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 851-865.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary; game; theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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