Multi-agent evolutionary game analysis of the coal mine on-site regulatory mode

Preventing the risk of coal mine safety production is a long-term issue of national supervision. At present, scholars' research on coal mine safety regulation lacks practical application scenarios and internal-external collaborative governance. Therefore, this paper based on coal mine on-site regulatory mode and combined with the expectation theory constructs a multi-agent evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, regulators and front-line workers in the context of government regulation, and simulates how the government improves the efficiency of resident supervision mode. The simulation results are as follows. First, for coal mining enterprises, increase supervision and punishment, government support for safety production can promote the safety production of enterprises; Secondly, the government reduces the regulatory costs of regulators while improving the regulatory benefits, which will ease the regulatory pressure of regulators and urge them to strictly regulate. Increasing the rewards for effective regulation would increase the incentive for regulators to enforce the law rigorously. In addition, workers' supervision has a mutual restraint effect on the safety production of coal mine enterprises and the strict supervision of regulators. The government can promote the enthusiasm of workers' supervision by improving the reward for the success of workers' supervision, so as to avoid collusion between enterprises and regulators. Finally, when the regulators strictly perform their supervisory duties and the enterprises stabilize and produce safely, the supervision of workers will not play a role and the on-site regulatory mode will reach the best situation.