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Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation

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  • Jin, Tao
  • Jiang, Yulian
  • Liu, Xingwen

Abstract

To discuss how to promote the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) through low regulatory costs after the removal of financial subsidies, in this paper, an evolutionary game model between local governments and vehicle manufacturers is developed. In the model, we suppose a series of parameters based on academic research and practical situations. Then the model and its parameters are analyzed and verified by system dynamics simulation. The study shows that: (1) Compared with the static, the dynamic dual credit policy enables the system to have an equilibrium stability point, which helps the development of NEVs. (2) The cost of local government regulation is reduced by the effective implementation of the dynamic dual credit policy. (3) After the removal of financial subsidies, consumers focus on personal experience. Therefore, government and enterprises should focus on technological breakthroughs and infrastructure development.

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  • Jin, Tao & Jiang, Yulian & Liu, Xingwen, 2023. "Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 440(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:440:y:2023:i:c:s0096300322007457
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2022.127677
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    4. Liwen Shi & Zhonglin Fu & Wei Guo & Jing Zhang & Jiang Sun, 2023. "Exploring the Factors That Promote Sustainable Growth in Regional Sales of New Energy Vehicles: An Empirical Study of China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(8), pages 1-16, April.

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