IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v14y2022i23p15549-d980951.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Influence of the Government Department on the Production Capacity Reserve of Emergency Enterprises Based on Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game

Author

Listed:
  • Xinshang You

    (School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China)

  • Shuo Zhao

    (School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China)

  • Yanbo Yang

    (School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China)

  • Dongli Zhang

    (School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China)

Abstract

With the frequent occurrence of world emergency events, the emergency management of government departments in various countries is facing great challenges. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of various emergency resources is prominent, and the emergency supplies reserve combined by governments and enterprises is an important guarantee for dealing with emergency management problems. This paper mainly studies the impact of a government sustainability-oriented innovation policy on the production capacity reserve of security emergency enterprises (SEEs), and constructs an evolutionary game model between the local government and SEEs. Then, it focuses on the impact of a reputation mechanism on the government enterprise cooperative reserve. According to the condition of a country, the central government’s punishment mechanism is introduced, and the evolutionary and stable strategies of the behavior choices of the local government and SEEs are compared and analyzed. Combined with the evolution degree of emergency events, the numerical simulation analysis is used to deduce and simulate the multi scenario of the example model. The results show that the reputation mechanism can effectively promote the evolution of government and enterprises to the ideal state under various scenarios. When the punishment intensity of the central government is higher than the total benefit of the implementation of the mere formality policy by the local government, it can effectively prevent the omission of the local government. This study provides a new idea for the government to formulate reasonable policies to promote SEEs to reserve production capacity, which is more conducive to government enterprise cooperation to deal with emergency events.

Suggested Citation

  • Xinshang You & Shuo Zhao & Yanbo Yang & Dongli Zhang, 2022. "Influence of the Government Department on the Production Capacity Reserve of Emergency Enterprises Based on Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(23), pages 1-35, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:23:p:15549-:d:980951
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/23/15549/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/23/15549/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ai, Yun-fei & Lu, Jing & Zhang, Li-li, 2015. "The optimization model for the location of maritime emergency supplies reserve bases and the configuration of salvage vessels," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 170-188.
    2. Fei, Liguo & Wang, Yanqing, 2022. "Demand prediction of emergency materials using case-based reasoning extended by the Dempster-Shafer theory," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    3. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    4. Youwei Yuan & Lanying Du & Xiumei Li & Fan Chen, 2022. "An Evolutionary Game Model of the Supply Decisions between GNPOs and Hospitals during a Public Health Emergency," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-23, January.
    5. Zhao, Dan & Ji, Shou-feng & Wang, He-ping & Jiang, Li-wen, 2021. "How do government subsidies promote new energy vehicle diffusion in the complex network context? A three-stage evolutionary game model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    6. Yunlong Liu & Leiyu Chen & Chengfeng Huang, 2022. "A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Transportation Carbon Emission Reduction across Regions under Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(17), pages 1-19, August.
    7. Elodie Adida & Po-Ching DeLaurentis & Mark Lawley, 2011. "Hospital stockpiling for disaster planning," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(5), pages 348-362.
    8. Sudhanshu Joshi & Manu Sharma & Rashmi Prava Das & Joanna Rosak-Szyrocka & Justyna Żywiołek & Kamalakanta Muduli & Mukesh Prasad, 2022. "Modeling Conceptual Framework for Implementing Barriers of AI in Public Healthcare for Improving Operational Excellence: Experiences from Developing Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(18), pages 1-23, September.
    9. Shameem Heetun & Fred Phillips & Sehee Park, 2018. "Post†disaster Cooperation Among Aid Agencies," Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 233-247, May.
    10. Wang, Xihui & Li, Feng & Liang, Liang & Huang, Zhimin & Ashley, Allan, 2015. "Pre-purchasing with option contract and coordination in a relief supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 170-176.
    11. Clay Whybark, D., 2007. "Issues in managing disaster relief inventories," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1-2), pages 228-235, July.
    12. Lanying Du & Ling Qian, 2016. "The government’s mobilization strategy following a disaster in the Chinese context: an evolutionary game theory analysis," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 80(3), pages 1411-1424, February.
    13. Coskun, Abdullah & Elmaghraby, Wedad & Karaman, M. Muge & Salman, F. Sibel, 2019. "Relief aid stocking decisions under bilateral agency cooperation," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 147-165.
    14. Anne M. Quarshie & Rudolf Leuschner, 2020. "Interorganizational Interaction in Disaster Response Networks: A Government Perspective," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 56(3), pages 3-25, July.
    15. Zhang, Weijian & Shi, Xianliang & Huang, Anqiang & Hua, Guowei & Teunter, Ruud H., 2023. "Optimal stock and capital reserve policies for emergency medical supplies against epidemic outbreaks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 304(1), pages 183-191.
    16. You, Mengjie & Li, Shuang & Li, Dingwei & Cao, Qingren & Xu, Feng, 2020. "Evolutionary game analysis of coal-mine enterprise internal safety inspection system in China based on system dynamics," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jingxian Chen & Liang Liang & Dong-Qing Yao, 2017. "Pre-positioning of relief inventories for non-profit organizations: a newsvendor approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 259(1), pages 35-63, December.
    2. Sun, Yong & Liu, Baoyin & Sun, Zhongrui & Yang, Ruijia, 2023. "Inter-regional cooperation in the transfers of energy-intensive industry: An evolutionary game approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 282(C).
    3. Fan, Yu & Shao, Jianfang & Wang, Xihui & Liang, Liang, 2024. "Contract design between relief organisations and private-sector vendors: A humanitarian logistics framework," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    4. Shitao Gong & Xin Gao & Zhou Li & Linyan Chen, 2021. "Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(7), pages 1-29, March.
    5. Wenxin Su & Xin Gao & Yukun Jiang & Jinrong Li, 2021. "Developing a Construction Safety Standard System to Enhance Safety Supervision Efficiency in China: A Theoretical Simulation of the Evolutionary Game Process," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(23), pages 1-22, December.
    6. Chen, Yingzhen & Zhao, Qiuhong & Huang, Kai & Xi, Xunzhuo, 2022. "A Bi-objective optimization model for contract design of humanitarian relief goods procurement considering extreme disasters," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    7. Meng, Huixing & Liu, Xuan & Xing, Jinduo & Zio, Enrico, 2022. "A method for economic evaluation of predictive maintenance technologies by integrating system dynamics and evolutionary game modelling," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    8. Yao, Chen & Fan, Bo & Zhao, Yupan & Cheng, Xinyue, 2023. "Evolutionary dynamics of supervision-compliance game on optimal pre-positioning strategies in relief supply chain management," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(PB).
    9. Fan Chen & Sen Liu & Andrea Appolloni, 2020. "Horizontal Coordination of I-LNGOs in the Humanitarian Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(15), pages 1-21, July.
    10. Baruch Keren, 2023. "Prepositioning Emergency Inventories Under Uncertainties of Time, Location, and Quantity," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-25, June.
    11. Zhang, Meng & Kong, Zhaojun, 2023. "A two-phase combinatorial double auction and negotiation mechanism for socialized joint reserve mode in emergency preparedness," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(PA).
    12. Daniel Seaberg & Laura Devine & Jun Zhuang, 2017. "A review of game theory applications in natural disaster management research," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 89(3), pages 1461-1483, December.
    13. Patra, T. Devi Prasad & Jha, J.K., 2021. "A two-period newsvendor model for prepositioning with a post-disaster replenishment using Bayesian demand update," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    14. Yanmin Ouyang & Haoran Zhao, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control for Public Health Emergencies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-20, November.
    15. Zhang, Weijian & Shi, Xianliang & Huang, Anqiang & Hua, Guowei & Teunter, Ruud H., 2023. "Optimal stock and capital reserve policies for emergency medical supplies against epidemic outbreaks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 304(1), pages 183-191.
    16. Guo, Jian & Zhong, Minghao & Chen, Shuran, 2022. "Analysis and simulation of BECCS vertical integration model in China based on evolutionary game and system dynamics," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 252(C).
    17. Yu, Hui & Li, Ying & Wang, Wei, 2023. "Optimal innovation strategies of automakers with market competition under the dual-credit policy," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 283(C).
    18. Pengxi Yang & Fei Gao & Hua Zhang, 2021. "Multi-Player Evolutionary Game of Network Attack and Defense Based on System Dynamics," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(23), pages 1-18, November.
    19. Yusen Ye & Wen Jiao & Hong Yan, 2020. "Managing Relief Inventories Responding to Natural Disasters: Gaps Between Practice and Literature," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(4), pages 807-832, April.
    20. Qianru Chen & Hualin Xie & Qunli Zhai, 2022. "Management Policy of Farmers’ Cultivated Land Abandonment Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-23, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:23:p:15549-:d:980951. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.