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Performance evaluation and creativity: Balancing originality and usefulness

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  • Ostermaier, Andreas
  • Uhl, Matthias

Abstract

Innovation requires creative ideas, which are both original and useful. Usefulness is crucial for ideas to be implemented and turn into innovation. We examine how performance evaluation helps balance both dimensions. In a laboratory experiment, creators generate words, which users and jurors rate for creativity. Users use the words to write texts, whereas jurors do not use them. Creators’ pay depends either on user or juror ratings. Creators take their evaluators’ perspective and accommodate their preferences. Our findings highlight the instrumental role of the evaluator in motivating creativity. It suggests that firms involve users in performance evaluation to facilitate innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ostermaier, Andreas & Uhl, Matthias, 2020. "Performance evaluation and creativity: Balancing originality and usefulness," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:86:y:2020:i:c:s2214804319303581
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101552
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    Cited by:

    1. Jasmijn Bol & Lisa Laviers & Jason Sandvik, 2023. "Creativity Contests: An Experimental Investigation of Eliciting Employee Creativity," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 47-94, March.
    2. Grözinger, Nicola & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Laske, Katharina & Schröder, Marina, 2020. "Innovation and communication media in virtual teams – An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 201-218.
    3. Hou, Jianhua & Wang, Dongyi & Li, Jing, 2022. "A new method for measuring the originality of academic articles based on knowledge units in semantic networks," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3).
    4. Mittone, Luigi & Morreale, Azzurra & Vu, Thi-Thanh-Tam, 2022. "What drives innovative behavior?- An experimental analysis on risk attitudes, creativity and performance," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).

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