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Outsourcing Information Security: Contracting Issues and Security Implications

Author

Listed:
  • Asunur Cezar

    (Department of Business Administration, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara 06560, Turkey)

  • Huseyin Cavusoglu

    (Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080)

  • Srinivasan Raghunathan

    (Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080)

Abstract

A unique challenge in information security outsourcing is that neither the outsourcing firm nor the managed security service provider (MSSP) perfectly observes the outcome , the occurrence of a security breach, of prevention effort. Detection of security breaches often requires specialized effort. The current practice is to outsource both prevention and detection to the same MSSP. Some security experts have advocated outsourcing prevention and detection to different MSSPs. We show that the former outsourcing contract leads to a significant disincentive to provide detection effort. The latter contract alleviates this problem but introduces misalignment of incentives between the firm and the MSSPs and eliminates the advantages offered by complementarity between prevention and detection functions, which may lead to a worse outcome than the current contract. We propose a new contract that is superior to these two on various dimensions. This paper was accepted by Lorin Hitt, information systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Asunur Cezar & Huseyin Cavusoglu & Srinivasan Raghunathan, 2014. "Outsourcing Information Security: Contracting Issues and Security Implications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(3), pages 638-657, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:60:y:2014:i:3:p:638-657
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1763
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Kai-Lung Hui & Ping Fan Ke & Yuxi Yao & Wei T. Yue, 2019. "Bilateral Liability-Based Contracts in Information Security Outsourcing," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(2), pages 411-429, June.
    4. Yong Wu & Junlin Duan & Tao Dai & Dong Cheng, 2020. "Managing Security Outsourcing in the Presence of Strategic Hackers," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 235-259, September.
    5. Guang Zhu & Hu Liu & Mining Feng, 2018. "Sustainability of Information Security Investment in Online Social Networks: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 6(10), pages 1-19, September.
    6. Xing Gao & Siyu Gong, 2022. "An economic analysis of information security outsourcing with competitive firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2748-2758, October.
    7. Krishnan S. Anand & Manu Goyal, 2019. "Ethics, Bounded Rationality, and IP Sharing in IT Outsourcing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5252-5267, November.
    8. Huang, Min & Tu, Jun & Chao, Xiuli & Jin, Delong, 2019. "Quality risk in logistics outsourcing: A fourth party logistics perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 276(3), pages 855-879.
    9. Yonghua Ji & Subodha Kumar & Vijay Mookerjee, 2016. "When Being Hot Is Not Cool: Monitoring Hot Lists for Information Security," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 27(4), pages 897-918, December.
    10. Tejaswini C. Herath & Hemantha S. B. Herath & David Cullum, 2023. "An Information Security Performance Measurement Tool for Senior Managers: Balanced Scorecard Integration for Security Governance and Control Frameworks," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 681-721, April.
    11. Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong, 2016. "A differential game approach to security investment and information sharing in a competitive environment," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(6), pages 511-526, June.
    12. Xiaowei Zhu, 2017. "Outsourcing management under various demand Information Sharing scenarios," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 257(1), pages 449-467, October.

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