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Coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high-tech manufacturing organizations (HTMOs)

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  • Ugarte, Armando
  • Oren, Shmuel

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  • Ugarte, Armando & Oren, Shmuel, 2000. "Coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high-tech manufacturing organizations (HTMOs)," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 235-252, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:67:y:2000:i:3:p:235-252
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    1. Xiao, Tiaojun & Yu, Gang, 2006. "Supply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity-setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 173(2), pages 648-668, September.
    2. Tiaojun Xiao & Gang Yu & Zhaohan Sheng & Yusen Xia, 2005. "Coordination of a Supply Chain with One-Manufacturer and Two-Retailers Under Demand Promotion and Disruption Management Decisions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 135(1), pages 87-109, March.
    3. Xiao, Tiaojun & Yang, Danqin, 2009. "Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(3), pages 1076-1085, August.

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