The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.018
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Cited by:
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"Conformity and Influence,"
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- David Goldbaum, 2016. "Conformity and Influence," Working Paper Series 35, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
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- Park, Youngseok & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A. & Grossman, Philip J., 2021.
"An endogenous-timing conflict game,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 592-607.
- Youngseok Park & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rud & Philip J. Grossman, 2020. "An endogenous-timing conflict game," Monash Economics Working Papers 13-20, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Philip J. Grossman & Youngseok Park & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rud, 2019. "Gender differences in an endogenous timing conflict game," Working Papers 141, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2018. "Who runs first to the bank?," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1826, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Neset Joslin, Knut-Eric, 2018. "Should I Stay or should I Go? Bandwagons in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 86-97.
- Zhou, Beixi, 2024. "Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 141-166.
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- Duan, Jieyi & Kobayashi, Hajime & Shichijo, Tatsuhiro, 2020. "Does cheap talk promote coordination under asymmetric information? An experimental study on global games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Coordination; Delay; Information; Global games; Experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
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