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Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies

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  • Inoue, Tomoki

Abstract

We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.

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  • Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:2:p:141-149
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.12.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
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    14. Inoue, Tomoki, 2011. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 430, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiuqiang Liu & Xiaodong Liu, 2014. "Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 975-990, November.
    2. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2014. "Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 529-554, November.
    3. Liu, Jiuqiang, 2017. "Equivalence of the Aubin bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a finite coalition production economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 55-61.

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