The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set
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Cited by:
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009.
"Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies,"
Working Papers
wp2009_0911, CEMFI.
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007.
"Information transmission in coalitional voting games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May.
- Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 519, Econometric Society.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," UC3M Working papers. Economics we055726, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers 0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008.
"Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies,"
Working Papers
2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2008-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 801-827, December.
- Myerson, Roger B., 2007.
"Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 260-285, September.
- Roger Myerson, 2004. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 659, Econometric Society.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2005.
"Two remarks on the inner core,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 143-154, February.
- DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, 2002. "Two remarks on the inner core," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, 2005. "Two remarks on the inner core," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1763, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
- Geoffroy Clippel, 2003.
"An axiomatization of the inner core,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(4), pages 563-569, September.
- DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy, 2001. "An axiomatization of the inner core," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2008.
"An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 316-323, February.
- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2005. "An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games," Working Papers 2005-02, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004.
"Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(42), pages 1-10.
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games," Game Theory and Information 0411001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04093, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1997. "On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 81-101, November.
- Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2022. "Barter markets, indivisibilities, and Markovian core," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 39-48, January.
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