IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/etbull/v11y2023i1d10.1007_s40505-023-00242-w.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure

Author

Listed:
  • Ken Urai

    (Osaka University)

  • Hiromi Murakami

    (Otemon Gakuin University)

  • Weiye Chen

    (Osaka University)

Abstract

We generalize the notion of Ichiishi (Econometrica 49(2):369–377, 1981)’s social coalitional equilibrium to a multi-layered coalition structure with parameters, in which agents can incorporate simultaneously multiple coalition structures with multiple independent coalition-deviation opportunities. For each opportunity, agents play a social coalitional equilibrium (SCE) game, called a sub-parametric SCE game, constrained by external environment (parameters and joint decisions of all other sub-parametric SCE games). The generalized social coalitional equilibrium (GSCE) concept is, therefore, considered to be a synthesis of the Nash equilibrium concept and the cooperative solution concept. We provide the definition of GSCE and give the proof of existence theorem. Through some applications to general equilibrium models, the GSCE concept provides a conceptual framework for describing coexisting different industries having independent investment opportunities and their simultaneously determined industrial organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami & Weiye Chen, 2023. "Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 1-25, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:11:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-023-00242-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00242-w
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-023-00242-w
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s40505-023-00242-w?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zhe Yang & Haiqun Zhang, 2019. "NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 155-170, September.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/89 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-26, October.
    4. Yang, Zhe, 2017. "Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf’s theorem: Finite-coalition α-cores and weak α-cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 81-85.
    5. Joseph Greenberg, 1979. "Existence and Optimality of Equilibrium in Labour-managed Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(3), pages 419-433.
    6. Zhao, Jingang, 1992. "The hybrid solutions of an N-person game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 145-160, January.
    7. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1977. "Coalition Structure in a Labor-Managed Market Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 341-360, March.
    8. Vincenzo Scalzo, 2022. "Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, May.
    9. Ichiishi,Tatsuro, 1993. "The Cooperative Nature of the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521414449, September.
    10. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1981. "A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 369-377, March.
    11. Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Quinzii, Martine, 1983. "Decentralization for the Core of a Production Economy with Increasing Returns," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 397-412, June.
    12. Ken Urai, 2010. "Fixed Points and Economic Equilibria," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 7117, December.
    13. Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 143-148, February.
    14. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehlé, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 678.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    15. Volker Boehm, 1974. "The Core of an Economy with Production," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(3), pages 429-436.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-26, October.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/89 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Inoue, Tomoki, 2012. "Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 143-147.
    4. Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
    5. Yang, Zhe, 2020. "The weak α-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 43-50.
    6. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehlé, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 678.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    7. Yang, Zhe & Yuan, George Xianzhi, 2019. "Some generalizations of Zhao’s theorem: Hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 94-100.
    8. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Rostom, Fatma Zahra, 2022. "Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.
    9. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1985. "Management versus ownership, II," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 115-138, March.
    10. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2011. "Non-emptiness of the alpha-core," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 716, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    11. Jiuqiang Liu & Huihui Zhang, 2016. "Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 1095-1109, November.
    12. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    13. Martin Shubik & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Approximate Cores of a General Class of Economies: Part II. Set-Up Costs and Firm Formation in Coalition Production Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 619, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    14. Liu, Jiuqiang & Liu, Xiaodong, 2013. "A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 150-156.
    15. Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "The core-partition of a hedonic game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 176-185, September.
    16. Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1998. "Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 87-108, August.
    17. Yang, Zhe & Zhang, Xian, 2021. "A weak α-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    18. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 888-906, July.
    19. Brangewitz, Sonja & Brockhoff, Sarah, 2017. "Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-23.
    20. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2014. "Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 529-554, November.
    21. Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaı¨t, Tarik, 2013. "Absolute optimal solution for a compact and convex game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 353-361.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social coalitional equilibrium; Coalition production economy; Multi-layered coalition structures; Firm formation; Industrial organization structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:11:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-023-00242-w. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.