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Labour disputes, investment decisions and the judiciary

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  • Deffains, Bruno
  • Gabuthy, Yannick
  • Lambert, Eve-Angéline

Abstract

In this article, we show that the presence of the judiciary in the background of labour relationships is not neutral within these relations: its potential intervention in case of an ex-post layoff and conflict over the severance payment can promote ex-ante efficient specific investment decisions. This ability to promote efficiency depends on the judiciary's aptitude to balance out the parties' ex-post bargaining powers. Interestingly one of the results shows that, if workers' bargaining power in wage negotiations is low, which implies that they expect low returns from continuing the relationships, an increase in the exogenous layoff probability should lead judges to be less lenient towards them.

Suggested Citation

  • Deffains, Bruno & Gabuthy, Yannick & Lambert, Eve-Angéline, 2010. "Labour disputes, investment decisions and the judiciary," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 424-433, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:17:y:2010:i:2:p:424-433
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    1. Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline Lambert & Lionel Thomas, 2013. "Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-55, February.
    2. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen R., 2017. "Inside severance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 211-225.

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