IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpb/discus/148.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Exploring the ambiguous impact of employment protection on employment and productivity

Author

Listed:
  • Egbert Jongen
  • Sabine Visser

Abstract

The impact of employment protection on employment and productivity is ambiguous in empirical work. We seek to explain why, studying various types of employment protection in a vintage model with specific investments by firms and workers. First, the analysis shows that the impact of severance pay can be quite different from other types of employment protection. Lumping them together, as in the OECD indicator, then seems a poor empirical strategy, and we provide empirical support for this. Second, starting from underinvestment in specific investments, firing costs may actually raise productivity, despite the sclerosis effect on the production structure. Third, we show that the tenure profile of employment protection matters. The impact of constant employment protection, popular in theoretical work, is quite different from the impact of rising employment protection, popular in practice. We illustrate a number of points quantitatively in a calibration exercise for the Netherlands.

Suggested Citation

  • Egbert Jongen & Sabine Visser, 2010. "Exploring the ambiguous impact of employment protection on employment and productivity," CPB Discussion Paper 148, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:148
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/exploring-ambiguous-impact-employment-protection.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Caballero, Ricardo J. & Cowan, Kevin N. & Engel, Eduardo M.R.A. & Micco, Alejandro, 2013. "Effective labor regulation and microeconomic flexibility," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 92-104.
    3. Alonso-Borrego, César & Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique, 2004. "Evaluating Labor Market Reforms: A General Equilibrium Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 1129, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Giulio Fella, 2004. "Optimal severance pay in a matching model," 2004 Meeting Papers 794, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    6. William Kerr & Adriana Kugler & David Autor, 2007. "Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States," Working Papers 07-04, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    7. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen & Jackman, Richard, 2005. "Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199279173.
    8. Cahuc, Pierre & Postel-Vinay, Fabien, 2002. "Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, February.
    9. Robert Shimer, 1999. "Why Is the US Unemployment Rate So Much Lower?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1998, volume 13, pages 11-74, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ricardo J. Caballero & Mohamad L. Hammour, 1998. "The Macroeconomics of Specificity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 724-767, August.
    11. Samuel Bentolila & Giuseppe Bertola, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402.
    12. Broersma, Lourens & Van Ours, Jan C., 1999. "Job searchers, job matches and the elasticity of matching," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 77-93, March.
    13. Ricardo J. Caballero & Mohamad L. Hammour, 1996. "On the Timing and Efficiency of Creative Destruction," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(3), pages 805-852.
    14. Michèle Belot & Jan Boone & Jan Van Ours, 2007. "Welfare‐Improving Employment Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(295), pages 381-396, August.
    15. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2002. "Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk: Implications for Optimal Employment Contracts," CEP Discussion Papers dp0542, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    16. Gilles Saint-Paul, 1995. "The High Unemployment Trap," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(2), pages 527-550.
    17. Olivier J. Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2008. "The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 45-77, March.
    18. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2002. "The Political Economy of Employment Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 672-701, June.
    19. Giulio Fella, 2004. "Optimal severance pay in a matching model," 2004 Meeting Papers 794, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    20. Nickell, Stephen & Layard, Richard, 1999. "Labor market institutions and economic performance," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 3029-3084, Elsevier.
    21. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Wolter H. J. Hassink & Jan C. Van Ours, 1996. "Job Turnover and Labor Turnover: A taxinomy of Employment Dynamics," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 41-42, pages 21-40.
    22. Olivier Blanchard, 2000. "What Do We Know about Macroeconomics that Fisher and Wicksell Did Not?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1375-1409.
    23. Broersma, Lourens & den Butter, Frank A. G. & Kock, Udo, 2000. "A national accounting system for worker flows," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 331-336, June.
    24. M. I. Kamien & E. Muller, 1976. "Optimal Control with Integral State Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(3), pages 469-473.
    25. Richard Freeman, 2005. "Labour market institutions without blinders: The debate over flexibility and labour market performance," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 129-145.
    26. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Rogerson, Richard, 1993. "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 915-938, October.
    27. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. repec:adr:anecst:y:1996:i:41-42:p:02 is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Osuna Victoria, 2005. "The Effects of Reducing Firing Costs in Spain: A Lost Opportunity?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-29, May.
    30. Fernando Alvarez & Marcelo Veracierto, 1998. "Search, self-insurance and job-security provisions," Working Paper Series WP-98-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    31. S. Kuipers & J. Muysken & J. Sinderen, 1979. "The vintage approach to output and employment growth in the Netherlands, 1921–1976," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 115(3), pages 485-507, September.
    32. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    33. Pietro Garibaldi & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005. "The Employment Effects of Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 799-832, October.
    34. Topel, Robert, 1990. "Specific capital and unemployment: Measuring the costs and consequences of job loss," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 181-214, January.
    35. David H. Autor & William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, 2007. "Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence From US States," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(521), pages 189-217, June.
    36. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Erratum: Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1197-1197, December.
    37. Caballero, Ricardo J & Hammour, Mohamad L, 1994. "The Cleansing Effect of Recessions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1350-1368, December.
    38. Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
    39. Pedro Portugal & Olivier Blanchard, 2001. "What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 187-207, March.
    40. Rob Alessie & Hans Bloemen, 2004. "Premium differentiation in the Unemployment Insurance system and the demand for labor," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 17(4), pages 729-765, December.
    41. Bassanini, Andrea & Booth, Alison L. & Brunello, Giorgio & De Paola, Maria & Leuven, Edwin, 2005. "Workplace Training in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 1640, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    42. Stefano Scarpetta & Philip Hemmings & Thierry Tressel & Jaejoon Woo, 2002. "The Role of Policy and Institutions for Productivity and Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Micro and Industry Data," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 329, OECD Publishing.
    43. Anja Deelen & Egbert Jongen & Sabine Visser, 2006. "Employment protection legislation; lessons from theoretical and empirical studies for the Dutch case," CPB Document 135, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    44. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2003. "The Economics of Employment Protection," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 24(1), pages 85-129, January.
    45. Michael Pries & Richard Rogerson, 2005. "Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions, and Labor Market Flows," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 811-839, August.
    46. Pissarides, Christopher A., 2001. "Employment protection," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 131-159, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kox, Henk L.M. & Van Leeuwen, George & Van der Wiel, Henry, 2011. "Being numerous does not yield efficiency - Productivity and entry-exit determinants in European business services," MPRA Paper 106166, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2011.
    2. Henk Kox & George van Leeuwen & Henry van der Wiel, 2010. "Small firms captive in a box like lobsters," CPB Discussion Paper 158, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bjuggren, Carl Magnus, 2013. "The Effect of Employment Protection Rules on Firm Productivity - A Natural Experiment," HUI Working Papers 82, HUI Research, revised 30 Oct 2013.
    2. Andrea Vindigni & Simone Scotti & Cristina Tealdi, 2015. "Uncertainty and the Politics of Employment Protection," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 209-267.
    3. Eric J. Bartelsman & Pieter A. Gautier & Joris De Wind, 2016. "Employment Protection, Technology Choice, And Worker Allocation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 787-826, August.
    4. Romain Duval & Prakash Loungani, 2021. "Designing Labor Market Institutions in Emerging Market and Developing Economies: A Review of Evidence and IMF Policy Advice," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(1), pages 31-83, March.
    5. Ahrens, Steffen & Wesselbaum, Dennis, 2009. "On the introduction of firing costs," Kiel Working Papers 1559, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Rogerson, Richard & Shimer, Robert, 2011. "Search in Macroeconomic Models of the Labor Market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 7, pages Pages: 61, Elsevier.
    7. Per Skedinger, 2010. "Employment Protection Legislation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13686.
    8. Steinar Holden & Åsa Rosén, 2014. "Discrimination And Employment Protection," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(6), pages 1676-1699, December.
    9. Charlot, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2013. "Education and employment protection," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 3-23.
    10. Michau, Jean-Baptiste, 2015. "Optimal labor market policy with search frictions and risk-averse workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 93-107.
    11. Ant Bozkaya & William R. Kerr, 2009. "Labor Regulations and European Private Equity," Working Papers CEB 09-055.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    12. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2711-2805 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Yashiv, Eran, 2007. "Labor search and matching in macroeconomics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1859-1895, November.
    14. Mirella Damiani & Fabrizio Pompei & Andrea Ricci, 2011. "Temporary job protection and productivity growth in EU economies," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 87/2011, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia.
    15. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2009. "Employment protection reform in search economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 255-273, April.
    16. Karpuz, Ahmet & Kim, Kirak & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2020. "Employment protection laws and corporate cash holdings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    17. Li, Guangzhong & Fujiyama, Keishi & Wu, Cen & Zheng, Ying, 2024. "Employment protection, corporate governance, and labor productivity around the World," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    18. Hector Sala & José I. Silva & Manuel Toledo, 2012. "Flexibility at the Margin and Labor Market Volatility in OECD Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 991-1017, September.
    19. Holmlund, Bertil, 2014. "What do labor market institutions do?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 62-69.
    20. Bentolila, Samuel & Dolado, Juan J. & Jimeno, Juan F., 2019. "Dual Labour Markets Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 12126, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Borland, Jeff, 2005. "Impacts of Employment Regulation: Towards an Evaluation Framework," Occasional Papers 06/7, Ministry of Economic Development, New Zealand.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:148. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cpbgvnl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.