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Welfare improving employment protection

Author

Listed:
  • Belot, M.V.K.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Boone, J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • van Ours, J.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical model to show that in sectors where workers invest in firm specific knowledge employment protection legislation can raise employment, productivity and welfare. The model also predicts a U-shaped relation between firing costs and unemployment. Finally, it gives a rationale for the observation that more educated workers tend to have better protected jobs.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Belot, M.V.K. & Boone, J. & van Ours, J.C., 2007. "Welfare improving employment protection," Other publications TiSEM eee2f823-1384-4a2f-a4eb-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:eee2f823-1384-4a2f-a4eb-7985adc5890d
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bertola, Giuseppe & Rogerson, Richard, 1997. "Institutions and labor reallocation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1147-1171, June.
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    3. Cahuc, Pierre & Zylberberg, André, 1999. "Job protection, minimum wage and employment," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9914, CEPREMAP.
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    6. Nickell, Stephen & Layard, Richard, 1999. "Labor market institutions and economic performance," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 3029-3084, Elsevier.
    7. Teulings,Coen & Hartog,Joop, 2008. "Corporatism or Competition?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521049399, November.
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    10. Belot, Michele & van Ours, Jan C., 2001. "Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 403-418, December.
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    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8904 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J8 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards

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