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Social information and bandwagon behavior in voting: An economic experiment

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  • Bischoff, Ivo
  • Egbert, Henrik

Abstract

We present the first economic experiment on bandwagon behavior in voting. Subjects are given an individual endowment and vote by majority rule to either keep the endowment for private use or to donate it to a non-governmental organization. In our experiment, participants are divided at random in two treatments. Individuals in both treatments are provided with true yet diverging information regarding the approval rates observed in previous experimental sessions. Our results show that the voting behavior differs across treatments in a way that is consistent with bandwagon voting. They also confirm the importance of instrumental motives and – unlike the majority of previous experiments – find support for expressive voting motives. Finally, we assess the impact of the false-consensus effect from a theoretical perspective. We show that it has the potential to change voter behavior if it results from an anchoring bias and voters follow non-instrumental motives.

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  • Bischoff, Ivo & Egbert, Henrik, 2013. "Social information and bandwagon behavior in voting: An economic experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 270-284.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:34:y:2013:i:c:p:270-284
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto & Lekfuangfu, Warn N., 2022. "Counting on my vote not counting: Expressive voting in committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    2. Fishman, Arthur & Klunover, Doron, 2024. "Costly expressive voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 99-104.
    3. Yigit Oezcelik & Michel Tolksdorf, 2023. "Non-numerical and social anchoring in consumer-generated ratings," Working Papers 202319, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    4. Ivo Bischoff & Nataliya Kusa, 2015. "Policy preferences for inheritance taxation," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201531, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2023. "Expressive voting versus information avoidance: experimental evidence in the context of climate change mitigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 45-74, January.
    6. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
    7. Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2015. "What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 224-241.
    8. Roberto Ramos & Carlos Sanz, 2018. "Backing the incumbent in difficult times: the electoral impact of wildfires," Working Papers 1810, Banco de España.
    9. Alvin Etang & David Fielding & Stephen Knowles, 2016. "Who Votes Expressively, And Why? Experimental Evidence," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 105-116, April.
    10. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2020. "Expressive Voting vs. Self-Serving Ignorance," Working Papers 2020-33, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    11. Jean-Robert Tyran & Alexander K. Wagner, 2016. "Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting," Discussion Papers 16-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    12. Bischoff, Ivo & Krauskopf, Thomas, 2015. "Warm glow of giving collectively – An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 210-218.
    13. Ivo Bischoff & Thomas Krauskopf, 2013. "Motives of pro-social behavior in individual versus collective decisions – a comparative experimental study," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201319, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; Bandwagon; Social information; Voting motives; Economic experiment; False-consensus effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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