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How Much Do Voters Know? An Analysis Of Motivation And Political Awareness

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  • Philip Jones
  • Peter Dawson

Abstract

Downs argued that instrumental individuals have no incentive to incur costs to turn out to vote. High turnout rates are explained in terms of intrinsic value derived from action. But if it is important to individuals that they participate, surely it matters how they participate? This paper tests the proposition that voters acquire more political information than those who abstain because they believe they have a duty to participate in collective decision‐making processes. It also considers the relevance of civic duty when explaining systematic differences between preferences expressed by those who vote and by those who abstain. Choice expressed at the ballot box is not the same as demand revealed in markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Jones & Peter Dawson, 2008. "How Much Do Voters Know? An Analysis Of Motivation And Political Awareness," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(2), pages 123-142, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:55:y:2008:i:2:p:123-142
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00447.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon Kemp, 2002. "Public Goods and Private Wants," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2699.
    2. Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2019. "Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 241-259.
    2. Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2011. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 645-670, July.
    3. Bischoff, Ivo & Egbert, Henrik, 2013. "Social information and bandwagon behavior in voting: An economic experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 270-284.
    4. Niklas Potrafke, 2006. "Parties Matter in Allocating Expenditures: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 652, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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