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Framing of information on the use of public finances, regulatory fit of recipients and tax compliance

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  • Holler, Marianne
  • Hoelzl, Erik
  • Kirchler, Erich
  • Leder, Susanne
  • Mannetti, Lucia

Abstract

Information campaigns to increase tax compliance could be framed in different ways. They can either highlight the potential gains when tax compliance is high, or the potential losses when compliance is low. According to regulatory focus theory, such framing should be most effective when it is congruent with the promotion or prevention focus of its recipients. Two studies confirmed the hypothesized interaction effects between recipients' regulatory focus and framing of information campaigns, with tax compliance being highest under conditions of regulatory fit. To address taxpayers effectively, information campaigns by tax authorities should consider the positive and negative framing of information, and the moderating effect of recipients' regulatory focus.

Suggested Citation

  • Holler, Marianne & Hoelzl, Erik & Kirchler, Erich & Leder, Susanne & Mannetti, Lucia, 2008. "Framing of information on the use of public finances, regulatory fit of recipients and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 597-611, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:29:y:2008:i:4:p:597-611
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kirchler, Erich & Wahl, Ingrid, 2010. "Tax compliance inventory TAX-I: Designing an inventory for surveys of tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 331-346, June.
    2. Sassenberg, Kai & Scholl, Annika, 2013. "If I can do it my way…The influence of regulatory focus on job-related values and job attraction," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 58-70.
    3. Möhlmann, Axel, 2013. "Investor home bias and sentiment about the country benefiting from the tax revenue," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 31-46.
    4. Leder, Susanne & Mannetti, Lucia & Hölzl, Erik & Kirchler, Erich, 2010. "Regulatory fit effects on perceived fiscal exchange and tax compliance," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 271-277, April.
    5. Xiaomei Wang & Lin Zhang & Xiaoyu Jiang & Jia Wang, 2021. "Promoting Water Conservation Based on the Matching Effect of Regulatory Focus and Emotion," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(4), pages 1-12, February.
    6. Cafferata, Alessia & Cerruti, Gianluca & Mazzone, Giulio, 2022. "Taxation, health system endowment and quality of institutions: a "social" perception across Europe," MPRA Paper 112118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Fochmann, Martin & Kroll, Eike B., 2016. "The effects of rewards on tax compliance decisions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 38-55.
    8. Florack, Arnd & Keller, Johannes & Palcu, Johanna, 2013. "Regulatory focus in economic contexts," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 127-137.
    9. Brizi, Ambra & Giacomantonio, Mauro & Schumpe, Birga M. & Mannetti, Lucia, 2015. "Intention to pay taxes or to avoid them: The impact of social value orientation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 22-31.
    10. Li, Andrew & Evans, Joel & Christian, Michael S. & Gilliland, Stephen W. & Kausel, Edgar E. & Stein, Jordan H., 2011. "The effects of managerial regulatory fit priming on reactions to explanations," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 268-282, July.
    11. Kirchler, Erich & Hoelzl, Erik & Huber, Oswald, 2010. "Risk-defusing in decisions by probability of detection of harm and promotion and prevention focus," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 595-600, October.
    12. Fengqiu Xiao & Zhiwei Zheng & Heyi Zhang & Ziqiang Xin & Yinghe Chen & Yiwei Li, 2016. "Who Are You More Likely to Help? The Effects of Expected Outcomes and Regulatory Focus on Prosocial Performance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(11), pages 1-15, November.
    13. Fochmann, Martin & Kroll, Eike B., 2014. "The effects of rewards on tax compliance decisions," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 163, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    14. Lucia Mannetti & Ambra Brizi & Mauro Giacomantonio & E Tory Higgins, 2013. "Framing Political Messages to Fit the Audience’s Regulatory Orientation: How to Improve the Efficacy of the Same Message Content," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(10), pages 1-1, October.
    15. Mora-Esquivel, Ronald & Solís, Martín & Arzadun, Paula, 2022. "Delayed feedback, regulatory fit and goal framing effects on tax compliance: An exploratory study," Revista de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad de Costa Rica, vol. 40(2), July.
    16. Djawadi, Behnud Mir & Fahr, René, 2013. "The Impact of Tax Knowledge and Budget Spending Influence on Tax Compliance," IZA Discussion Papers 7255, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Mohammed Abdullahi Umar & Chek Derashid & Idawati Ibrahim, 2017. "What Is Wrong With the Fiscal Social Contract of Taxation in Developing Countries? A Dialogue With Self-Employed Business Owners in Nigeria," SAGE Open, , vol. 7(4), pages 21582440177, December.

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