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An axiomatic theory of political representation

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  • Chambers, Christopher P.

Abstract

We discuss the theory of gerrymandering-proof voting rules. Our approach is axiomatic. We show that, for votes over a binary set of alternatives, any rule that is unanimous, anonymous, and gerrymandering-proof must decide a social outcome as a function of the proportions of agents voting for each alternative, and must either be independent of this proportion, or be in one-to-one correspondence with the proportions. In an extended model in which the outcome of a vote at the district level can be a composition of a governing body (with two possible parties), we discuss the quasi-proportional rules (characterized by unanimity, anonymity, gerrymandering-proofness, strict monotonicity, and continuity). We show that we can always (pointwise) approximate a single-member district quota rule with a quasi-proportional rule. We also discuss a more general environment, where there may be more than two parties.

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  • Chambers, Christopher P., 2009. "An axiomatic theory of political representation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 375-389, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:375-389
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    5. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019. "Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(2), pages 225-246, February.
    2. Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 221-262, August.
    3. Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnádi, 2015. "Axiomatic districting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 31-50, January.
    4. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2017. "The strong referendum paradox," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1707-1731, July.
    5. Mihir Bhattacharya, 2016. "Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 839-861, April.

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