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Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures

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  • Nandeibam, Shasikanta

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  • Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2000. "Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 63-84, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:1:p:63-84
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas & Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1982. "The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 366-375, August.
    2. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1978. "Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 244-254, August.
    3. McLennan, Andrew, 1980. "Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-11, February.
    4. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Peleg, Bezalel, 1986. "Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 909-921, July.
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