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A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions

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  • Shasikanta Nandeibam

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  • Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2008. "A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 447-455, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:447-455
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Peleg, Bezalel, 1986. "Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 909-921, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Indraneel Dasgupta, 2011. "Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 643-658, October.

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