IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/aub/autbar/330.96.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers

Author

Listed:
  • Barbera, S
  • Bogomolnaia, A
  • van der Stel, H

Abstract

We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each progile of individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisfying strategy- proofness.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbera, S & Bogomolnaia, A & van der Stel, H, 1996. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 330.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:330.96
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Salvador Barbera, 1979. "Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 379-389.
    2. Freixas, Xavier, 1984. "A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 227-251, December.
    3. Gibbard, Allan, 1978. "Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 595-614, May.
    4. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-681, April.
    5. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Peleg, Bezalel, 1986. "Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 909-921, July.
    6. Barbera, Salvador, 1979. "A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 637-640, May.
    7. Michael D. Intriligator, 1973. "A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(4), pages 553-560.
    8. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1978. "Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 244-254, August.
    9. Barbera, Salvador & Valenciano, Federico, 1983. "Collective Probabilistic Judgements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1033-1046, July.
    10. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1973. "Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 934-946, September.
    11. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas & Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1982. "The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 366-375, August.
    12. Peter C. Fishburn, 1975. "A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice: Comment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 297-301.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.
    2. Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen, 2008. "Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 701-702, May.
    3. X. Ruiz del Portal, 2012. "Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 311-321, December.
    4. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2357-2375.
    5. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005. "Collective choice under dichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 165-184, June.
    6. Artemov, Georgy, 2014. "An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 380-385.
    7. Lars EHLERS & Dipjyoti MAJUMDAR & Debasis MISHRA & Arunava SEN, 2016. "Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms," Cahiers de recherche 04-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    8. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    9. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
    10. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2013. "The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 205-238, September.
    11. Yaron Azrieli & Christopher P. Chambers & Paul J. Healy, 2018. "Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1472-1503.
    12. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
    13. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2020. "Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 60-67.
    14. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2012. "The division problem with maximal capacity constraints," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 29-57, March.
    15. Ehlers, Lars & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2020. "Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 31-41.
    16. Postl Peter, 2011. "Strategy-Proof Compromises," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-37, October.
    17. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
    2. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2013. "The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 205-238, September.
    3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005. "Collective choice under dichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 165-184, June.
    4. Jérémy Picot, 2012. "Random aggregation without the Pareto principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(1), pages 1-13, March.
    5. Felix Brandt & Patrick Lederer & René Romen, 2024. "Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(1), pages 19-55, August.
    6. Felix Brandt & Matthias Greger & Erel Segal-Halevi & Warut Suksompong, 2024. "Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preferences," Papers 2402.15904, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    7. Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen, 2008. "Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 701-702, May.
    8. Regenwetter, Michel & Marley, A. A. J. & Grofman, Bernard, 2002. "A general concept of majority rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 405-428, July.
    9. Chambers, Christopher P., 2009. "An axiomatic theory of political representation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 375-389, January.
    10. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.
    11. Kim, Semin, 2017. "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 350-371.
    12. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
    13. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus, 2018. "On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-18.
    14. Nurmi, Hannu & Kacprzyk, Janusz & Fedrizzi, Mario, 1996. "Probabilistic, fuzzy and rough concepts in social choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 264-277, December.
    15. Nandeibam, Shasikanta, 2000. "Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 63-84, July.
    16. Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 392-416, October.
    17. Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.
    18. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona School of Economics.
    19. M. Sanver & Özer Selçuk, 2009. "Sophisticated preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 73-86, June.
    20. Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 117-145, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ECONOMIC THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS;

    JEL classification:

    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:330.96. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Xavier Vila (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ufuabes.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.