Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0938-8
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Other versions of this item:
- Mihir Bhattacharya, 2016. "Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 839-861, April.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019.
"Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains,"
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- Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019. "Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains," Post-Print hal-02510491, HAL.
- Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.
- Antonin Macé, 2015. "Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum?," AMSE Working Papers 1544, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 29 Oct 2015.
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