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Coalitional Power Structure In Stochastic Social Choice Functions With An Unrestricted Preference Domain

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  • Shasikanta Nandeibam

    (Delhi School of Economics)

Abstract

When the individuals in Pattanaik and Peleg [16] are permitted to have weak preference orders, we show that: (I) as in their paper, theft) is a unique weight for each coalition; and (ii) for each feasible proper subset of the universal set and each preference profile, UH.~ society call be partitioned, so that, the weight of each coalition in this partition gives the probability of choosing some alternative which is best in tile feasible set for at least one individual in the coalition. When the universal set is the feasible set, our result still hold provided certain additional condition are satisfied. Journal of Economic literature' Classification Number: D71

Suggested Citation

  • Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "Coalitional Power Structure In Stochastic Social Choice Functions With An Unrestricted Preference Domain," Working papers 12, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-681, April.
    2. McLennan, Andrew, 1980. "Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-11, February.
    3. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Peleg, Bezalel, 1986. "Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 909-921, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bishwanath Goldar & Badal Mukherji, 1998. "Pollution Abatement Cost Function: Methodological And Estimation Issues," Working papers 56, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

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