Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.002
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Cited by:
- Guha, Brishti, 2019. "Malice in pretrial negotiations," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 25-33.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining; Deadline effect; Delay; Disagreement; Fairness concerns; Justice sensitivity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
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