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Bargaining and Reputation

Author

Listed:
  • Dilip Abreu
  • Faruk Gul

Abstract

A complete information bargaining model is amended to accommodate "irrational types" who are inflexible in their offers and demands. An "independence of procedures" result is derived: the bargaining outcome is independent of the details of the bargaining protocol if players can make offers frequently. In the limiting continuous-time game, equilibrium is unique, and entails delay, consequently inefficiency. As the probability of irrationality goes to zero, delay and inefficiency disappear; furthermore, if there are a rich set of types for both agents, their limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:68:y:2000:i:1:p:85-118
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