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Law enforcement with a democratic government

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Langlais

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marie Obidzinski

    (CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze how political competition affects the design of public law enforcement policies. The article arrives at two main conclusions (assuming that the cost of enforcement is linear, criminal's type is uniformly distributed, and the society is wealthy enough): 1) electoral competition entails no loss of efficiency at equilibrium for both minor and major offenses (e.g. minor offenses are not enforced, while major ones are fully deterred); 2) distortions arises at equilibrium only in the range of intermediate offenses: enforcement expenditure for small offenses is lower than at optimal level, such that the issue of under-deterrence is exacerbated; in contrast, for more serious offenses, enforcement measures are higher, and there is more (possibly, over) deterrence as compared to what efficiency requires. We show that these results also generalize under more general assumptions, except that full deterrence of major offenses is no longer achievable (a less wealthy society), or enforcement expenditure is bounded above (under convex enforcement costs).

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2017. "Law enforcement with a democratic government," Post-Print hal-04034740, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04034740
    DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahw015
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(2), pages 377-412.
    2. Murat C Mungan & Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error," Working Papers hal-04229266, HAL.
    3. Yahagi, Ken & Yamaguchi, Yohei, 2023. "Law enforcement with rent-seeking government under voting pressure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Thomas J. Miceli, 2022. "Counting offenders’ gains? Economic and moral considerations in the determination of criminality," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 475-496, December.
    5. Gilles Grolleau & Murat Mungan & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2022. "Letting Offenders Choose Their Own Punishment ?," Post-Print hal-03694337, HAL.
    6. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2017. "On Punishment Severity and Crime Rates," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 464-485.
    7. Chopard, Bertrand & Obidzinski, Marie, 2021. "Public law enforcement under ambiguity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    8. Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    9. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.
    10. Florian Baumann & Sophie Bienenstock & Tim Friehe & Maiva Ropaul, 2023. "Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 229-255, September.
    11. Gilles Grolleau & Murat C. Mungan & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2022. "Letting offenders choose their punishment?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 607-617, November.
    12. Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 141-157, February.
    13. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Private law enforcement with competing groups," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 285-297, August.
    14. Murat C. Mungan & Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Legislating for profit and optimal Eighth‐Amendment review," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1403-1416, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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