Prosocial Motivation and Incentives
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DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-063016-103739
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- Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2018. "Prosocial motivation and incentives," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90093, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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More about this item
Keywords
motivated agents; prosocial behavior; public services;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
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