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Over-incarceration and disenfranchisement

Author

Listed:
  • Murat C. Mungan

    (Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University)

Abstract

This article presents a model wherein law enforcers propose sentences to maximize their likelihood of reelection, and shows that elections typically generate over-incarceration, i.e., longer than optimal sentences. It then studies the effects of disenfranchisement laws, which prohibit convicted felons from voting. The removal of ex-convicts from the pool of eligible voters reduces the pressure politicians may otherwise face to protect the interests of this group, and thereby causes the political process to push the sentences for criminal offenses upwards. Therefore, disenfranchisement further widens the gap between the optimal sentence and the equilibrium sentence, and thereby exacerbates the problem of over-incarceration. Moreover, this result is valid even when voter turnout is negatively correlated with people’s criminal tendencies, i.e., when criminals vote less frequently than non-criminals.

Suggested Citation

  • Murat C. Mungan, 2017. "Over-incarceration and disenfranchisement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 377-395, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0448-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0448-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Murat C Mungan & Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2023. "Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 190-227.
    2. Daniel J. D’Amico & Claudia R. Williamson, 2019. "An empirical examination of institutions and cross-country incarceration rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 217-242, September.
    3. Friehe, Tim & Mungan, Murat C., 2022. "Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    4. Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    5. Yahagi, Ken & Yamaguchi, Yohei, 2023. "Law enforcement with rent-seeking government under voting pressure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    6. Lundberg, Alexander, 2019. "Leniency Can Increase Deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    7. Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 141-157, February.
    8. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.
    9. Murat C. Mungan & Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Legislating for profit and optimal Eighth‐Amendment review," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1403-1416, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disenfranchisement; Over-incarceration; Mass incarceration; Imprisonment; Crime and deterrence; Representative voter theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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