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Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector, and Firm Performance

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  • Bonaventura, Luigi
  • Orlando, Danilo

Abstract

In this paper we investigate how enforcement of regulation affects the size of irregular sector, firm perfomance and the exit rate to the market. Three kinds of enforcement policy will be tested in the model: control, punish and legitimacy. The first policy is based on the number of inspectors present in the economy; the second is defined by the magnitude of punish; the third is measured by the social legitimacy. Our results show the negligible influence of control to enforce irregularity; the strong effect of punish on irregular sector with a high exit rate; the good effect of legitimacy policy in promoting regularity with a low output performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonaventura, Luigi & Orlando, Danilo, 2007. "Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector, and Firm Performance," MPRA Paper 14686, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14686
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    3. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1998. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 387-392, May.
    4. Almeida, Rita & Carneiro, Pedro, 2005. "Enforcement of labor regulation, informal labor, and firm performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3756, The World Bank.
    5. R. Hirschowitz, 1989. "The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 57(4), pages 266-272, December.
    6. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
    7. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    8. Ihrig, Jane & Moe, Karine S., 2004. "Lurking in the shadows: the informal sector and government policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 541-557, April.
    9. Lando, Henrik & Shavell, Steven, 2004. "The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 209-218, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luigi Bonaventura, 2011. "Enforcement of regulation, irregular sector, and firm performance: a computational agent-based model," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 99-113, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Irregular sector; enforcement policies; exit rate; firm perfomance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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