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Voting rules in insolvency law: a simple-game theoretic approach

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  • Braham, Matthew
  • Steffen, Frank

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  • Braham, Matthew & Steffen, Frank, 2002. "Voting rules in insolvency law: a simple-game theoretic approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 421-442, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:4:p:421-442
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    1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, Restructuring, pages 215-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Baird, Douglas G & Picker, Randal C, 1991. "A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 311-349, June.
    3. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
    4. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 1995. "When is Size a Liability?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 301-316, July.
    5. Bebchuk, Lucian Ayre & Chang, Howard F, 1992. "Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 253-279, April.
    6. Leiserson, Michael, 1968. "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(3), pages 770-787, September.
    7. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    8. Frohlich, Norman, 1975. "The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 943-946, September.
    9. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    10. Julian R. Franks & Kjell G. Nyborg & Walter N. Torous, 1996. "A Comparison of UK, US and German Insolvency Codes," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 25(3), Fall.
    11. repec:cep:stitep:/1992/250 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, Spring.
    13. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 157-181, February.
    2. Stef, Nicolae, 2022. "How does legal design affect the initiation of a firm's bankruptcy?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    3. Nicolae STEF, 2013. "Severity of the Voting Rules in Bankruptcy," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2013-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    4. René van den Brink & Frank Steffen, 2007. "Positional Power in Hierarchies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-038/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps, 2014. "On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation," Working Papers hal-01377925, HAL.

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