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Online education, signaling, and human capital

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  • Perri, Timothy

Abstract

Online higher education may lower educational time cost for less able individuals more than for others. If education merely signals ability, decreasing education cost for the less able may decrease welfare by increasing over-investment in education by the more able. When education adds to human capital and may signal ability, decreasing education cost for the less able is more likely to increase welfare the smaller the productivity difference between the more and less able, and the smaller the fraction of the more able in the population.

Suggested Citation

  • Perri, Timothy, 2016. "Online education, signaling, and human capital," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 69-74.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:36:y:2016:i:c:p:69-74
    DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.06.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wada, Shuhei, 2021. "Online education and the Great Convergence," MPRA Paper 108793, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Signaling; Education cost; and Online education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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