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Signaling versus contingent contracts with costly turnover

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  • Perri, Timothy J.

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  • Perri, Timothy J., 2002. "Signaling versus contingent contracts with costly turnover," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 365-374, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:48:y:2002:i:4:p:365-374
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    2. Monojit Chatterji & Paul T. Seaman & Larry D. Singell Jr., 2003. "A test of the signalling hypothesis," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 191-215, April.
    3. Weiss, Andrew, 1988. "High School Graduation, Performance, and Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 785-820, August.
    4. Rosen, Sherwin, 2007. "Studies in Labor Markets," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226726304.
    5. repec:ucp:bknber:9780226726281 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    7. Eugene A. Kroch & Kriss Sjoblom, 1994. "Schooling as Human Capital or a Signal: Some Evidence," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(1), pages 156-180.
    8. Joanne Salop & Steven C. Salop, 1976. "Self-selection and turnover in the labor market," Special Studies Papers 80, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1998. "Employer Learning and the Signalling Value of Education," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Isao Ohashi & Toshiaki Tachibanaki (ed.), Internal Labour Markets, Incentives and Employment, chapter 8, pages 159-195, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 420-442, June.
    11. Barzel, Yoram, 1977. "Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 291-307, October.
    12. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
    13. Michael Spence, 1981. "Signaling, Screening, and Information," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Labor Markets, pages 319-358, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July.
    15. Joanne Salop & Steven Salop, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 619-627.
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