Learning to Signal in Market
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Other versions of this item:
- Georg Noldeke & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Learning to Signal in Markets," Game Theory and Information 9410001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Oct 1994.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Cooper, David J., 1997. "Barometric price leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 301-325, May.
- De Jaegher, Kris, 2008.
"Efficient communication in the electronic mail game,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 468-497, July.
- K. de Jaegher, 2007. "Efficient communication in the electronic mail game," Working Papers 07-11, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997.
"A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 118-156, March.
- Gerorg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection In Signaling Markets," ELSE working papers 038, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers 9518r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Noeldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1996. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Economics Series 27, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1995. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers 9518, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Robles, Jack, 2001. "Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.
- Gisèle Umbhauer, 1997. "Induction projective et processus évolutionnaires discrets," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 697-706.
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More about this item
Keywords
economic equilibrium ; game theory;JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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