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Learning to Signal in Market

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  • Noldeka, G.
  • Samuelson, L.

Abstract

We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which sellers choose signals that potentitally reveal their types. If the dynamic process selects a unique limiting outcome, then that outcome must be an undefeated equilibrium; though to be undefeated does not suffice to be the sole limiting outcome. If a Riley outcome exists that provides "high" type sellers with a higher utility than any other equilibrim outcome, then that outcome is the unique limiting outcome of our model. In the absence of a Riley outcome,. or if high type workers obtain higher utility in a pooling equlibrium than in the Riley outcome, a unique limit outcome will only emerge under very stringent conditions. If these conditions fail, the market will cycle between various equlibria and, possibly, nonequilibrrium outcomes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Noldeka, G. & Samuelson, L., 1994. "Learning to Signal in Market," Working papers 9409, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9409
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    Cited by:

    1. Cooper, David J., 1997. "Barometric price leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 301-325, May.
    2. De Jaegher, Kris, 2008. "Efficient communication in the electronic mail game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 468-497, July.
    3. Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 118-156, March.
    4. Robles, Jack, 2001. "Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.
    5. Gisèle Umbhauer, 1997. "Induction projective et processus évolutionnaires discrets," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 697-706.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic equilibrium ; game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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