Does Signaling Solve the Lemon’s Problem?
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- Timothy Perri, 2016. "Does signalling solve the lemons problem?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 227-229, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
lemons; signaling; and sorting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2013-05-24 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2013-05-24 (Microeconomics)
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