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The impacts of deterrence, social norms and legitimacy on forest rule compliance in Ghana

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  • Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta
  • Epstein, Graham

Abstract

Compliance is one of the central, but often overlooked challenges that actors face as they seek to devise and implement environmental policies. Therefore this paper draws upon multiple models of rule compliance to assess the factors influencing compliance in the high forest zone of Ghana. Specifically, the paper considers whether compliance with formal laws that prohibit the felling of timber trees, farming in forest reserves and the use of fire to clear land is explained by perceptions of government enforcement, social norms and/or the perceived legitimacy of rules and government officials while controlling for a number of potentially intervening factors, and each other. The results indicate that compliance is affected by deterrence, social norms, and the perceived fairness of laws; but more importantly it demonstrates that the factors affecting compliance vary across the three studied rules. Whereas compliance with the tree-felling rule is driven by government enforcement; compliance with the fire and farming rules appears to be linked to social norms and the fairness of rules. Given that levels of compliance are considerably higher for the bushfire and farming rules; we conclude by suggesting greater attention on the normative aspects of the compliance decision, and legal reforms that might align legislation with the social norms and practices of local users.

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  • Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Epstein, Graham, 2015. "The impacts of deterrence, social norms and legitimacy on forest rule compliance in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 10-20.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:55:y:2015:i:c:p:10-20
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2015.03.006
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    8. Osei-Tutu, Paul, 2017. "Taboos as informal institutions of local resource management in Ghana: Why they are complied with or not," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(P1), pages 114-123.

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