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Local rulemaking, enforcement and compliance in state-owned forest commons

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  • Epstein, Graham

Abstract

The literature on rule compliance is divided between those urging greater autonomy for stakeholders in rulemaking processes; and those arguing for increased enforcement. However recent experimental evidence highlights the potential for synergies between participatory rulemaking and enforcement. This paper therefore seeks to build upon these findings to explore the relationship between local rulemaking, local monitoring and compliance in field settings. The results which draw upon data about the behavior of 93 fuelwood user groups in state-owned forest commons in Asia, Africa and Latin America suggest that the average group is more likely to comply with rules when local rulemaking is combined with local monitoring. However, in some contexts it appears that local rulemaking in particular and other institutional arrangements in general may yield similar results.

Suggested Citation

  • Epstein, Graham, 2017. "Local rulemaking, enforcement and compliance in state-owned forest commons," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 312-321.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:131:y:2017:i:c:p:312-321
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.09.012
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