Rationality, institutions and environmental policy
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002.
"Psychological foundations of incentives,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, "undated". "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IEW - Working Papers 095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 714, CESifo.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997.
"Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5911, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Spash, Clive L. & Hanley, Nick, 1995.
"Preferences, information and biodiversity preservation,"
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 191-208, March.
- Nick Hanley & Clive L Spash, 1993. "Preferences, Information and Biodiversity Preservation," Working Papers Series 93/12, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Spash, Clive L. & Hanley, Nick, 1994. "Preferences, Information And Biodiversity Preservation," Discussion Papers in Ecological Economics 140531, University of Stirling, Department of Economics.
- Spash, Clive L. & Hanley, N, 1994. "Preferences, information and biodiversity preservation," MPRA Paper 38351, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000.
"Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810.
- Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Pay Enough - Or Don't Pay at All," Discussion Paper 1998-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Pay Enough - Or Don't Pay at All," Other publications TiSEM 641eb9a4-f245-483b-8c01-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- John M. Gowdy, 2004. "The Revolution in Welfare Economics and Its Implications for Environmental Valuation and Policy," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(2), pages 239-257.
- Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
- Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-162, April.
- Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 1998. "The Approach of Institutional Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 166-192, March.
- Victor R. Fuchs, 1996. "Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number fuch96-1.
- Günther G. Schulze & Björn Frank, 2003.
"Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 143-160, August.
- Bjorn Frank & Guenther G. Schulze, 2000. "Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0950, Econometric Society.
- Schulze, Günther G. & Frank, Björn, 2000. "Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility," Discussion Papers, Series I 303, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
- R. H. Coase, 2013.
"The Problem of Social Cost,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
- Ronald H. Coase, 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 5, pages 87-137, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
- Arild Vatn, 2004. "Environmental Valuation and Rationality," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(1), pages 1-18.
- Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
- Gregory, Robin & Lichtenstein, Sarah & Slovic, Paul, 1993. "Valuing Environmental Resources: A Constructive Approach," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 177-197, October.
- Paul M. Romer, 1996. "Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement," NBER Chapters, in: Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America, pages 195-228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Arild Vatn, 2005. "Institutions and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2826.
- Romp, Graham, 1997. "Game Theory: Introduction and Applications," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198775027.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Thomas H. Stevens & Jaime Echeverria & Ronald J. Glass & Tim Hager & Thomas A. More, 1991. "Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What Do CVM Estimates Really Show?," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(4), pages 390-400.
- Fuchs, Victor R. (ed.), 1996. "Individual and Social Responsibility," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226267869, August.
- Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
- Elster,Jon, 1983. "Explaining Technical Change," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521270724, January.
- Munda, Giuseppe, 2004. "Social multi-criteria evaluation: Methodological foundations and operational consequences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 158(3), pages 662-677, November.
- Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S. & Huck, Steffen, 2001.
"More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(1), pages 131-144, March.
- Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, "undated". "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers 052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gintis, Herbert, 2000. "Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 311-322, December.
- Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, 1994. "Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 45-64, Fall.
- W. Michael Hanemann, 1994. "Valuing the Environment through Contingent Valuation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 19-43, Fall.
- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
- Clark, Judy & Burgess, Jacquelin & Harrison, Carolyn M., 2000. ""I struggled with this money business": respondents' perspectives on contingent valuation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 45-62, April.
- Sunstein, Cass R, 1993. "Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 217-254, June.
- Marc R. Tool, 1995. "Pricing, Valuation And Systems," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 432.
- Lane,Robert E., 1991. "The Market Experience," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521407373, January.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
- Hausman,Daniel M., 1992. "The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521415019, December.
- Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, January.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Hausman,Daniel M., 1992. "The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521425230, December.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Vatn, Arild, 2009. "Cooperative behavior and institutions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 188-196, January.
- Vatn, Arild, 2009. "An institutional analysis of methods for environmental appraisal," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2207-2215, June.
- Veisten, Knut, 2007. "Contingent valuation controversies: Philosophic debates about economic theory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 204-232, April.
- Neuteleers, Stijn & Engelen, Bart, 2015. "Talking money: How market-based valuation can undermine environmental protection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 253-260.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002.
"Psychological foundations of incentives,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, "undated". "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IEW - Working Papers 095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 714, CESifo.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2005. "Incentives, Decision Frames, and Motivation Crowding Out – An Experimental Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 1758, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Schlapfer, Felix, 2008.
"Contingent valuation: A new perspective,"
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(4), pages 729-740, February.
- Felix Schlaepfer, 2007. "Contingent valuation: a new perspective," SOI - Working Papers 0715, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, "undated".
"Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats,"
IEW - Working Papers
187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2004. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2005. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 1379, CESifo.
- Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2006. "Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation," IZA Discussion Papers 2423, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Uri Gneezy, 2003. "The W effect of incentives," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000315, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jonathan Aldred, 2006. "Incommensurability and Monetary Valuation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(2), pages 141-161.
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2008. "Relative rewards within team-based compensation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 141-167, April.
- Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008.
"Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-76, May.
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie," Post-Print halshs-00180112, HAL.
- Dickinson, David L. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," IZA Discussion Papers 1222, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementary between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00176789, HAL.
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00175010, HAL.
- David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Marie-Claire Villeval & David Dickinson, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 0409, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Andrei Bremzen & Elena Khokhlova & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2015.
"Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects Of Rewards,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 55-70, March.
- Andrei Bremzeny & Elena Khokhlovaz & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2011. "Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects of Rewards," Working Papers w0164, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Andrei Bremzeny & Elena Khokhlovaz & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2011. "Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects of Rewards," Working Papers w0164, New Economic School (NES).
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno & Ule, Aljaz, 2009.
"In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 445-466, November.
- Goeree, J.K. & Riedl, A.M. & Ule, A., 2005. "In search of stars: network formation among heterogeneous agents," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Aljaž Ule & Jacob K. Goeree & Arno Riedl, 2007. "In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 2007.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Ule, Aljaz & Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno, 2007. "In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 9099, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno & Ule, Aljaz, 2005. "In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 1754, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated".
"Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?,"
IEW - Working Papers
034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gächter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3017, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2015.
"Theory And Evidence In Psychology And Economics About Motivation Crowding Out: A Possible Convergence?,"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 339-356, April.
- Pierre Garrouste & Agnès Festré, 2014. "Theory and evidence in psychology and economics about motivation crowding out: A possible convergence?," Post-Print hal-00926326, HAL.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2015. "Theory and evidence in psychology and economics about motivation crowding out: A possible convergence?," Post-Print halshs-01139308, HAL.
- Marc Deschamps & Julien Pénin, 2014.
"La construction d’une sanction. Le cas des pénalités de retard dans les centres de loisirs de la commune d’Asnières-sur-Seine,"
Working Papers of BETA
2014-20, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Julien Pénin & Marc Deschamps, 2015. "La construction d’une sanction: Le cas des pénalités de retard dans les centres de loisirs de la commune d’Asnières-sur-Seine," Working Papers hal-01377914, HAL.
- Marc Deschamps & Julien Pénin, 2015. "La construction d'une sanction Le cas des pénalités de retard dans les centres de loisirs de la commune d'Asnières-sur-Seine," Working Papers 2015-12, CRESE.
- Kirsten Bregn, 2013. "Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector? On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 21-35, March.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:55:y:2005:i:2:p:203-217. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.