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Evaluating the fulfillment of the principles of collective action in practice: A case study from Galicia (NW Spain)

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  • Alló, Maria
  • Loureiro, Maria L.

Abstract

We analyze the type of communal forest owners' management practices through a survey in Northern Spain. In particular, we test whether the Principles of Collective Action (PCA) postulated by Ostrom (1990) are being followed in a sample of communal forests. Second, we study whether such principles derive in better forest management practices and conservation outcomes. Our results show that PCA are not perfectly fulfilled in our sample, showing a clear room for improvement. However, we have also found that in areas where their application is more predominant, forest owners have better management practices. Specifically, we have found a negative relationship between the fulfillment of PCA and the number of forest fires in our sample, while considering other socio-economic and control variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Alló, Maria & Loureiro, Maria L., 2016. "Evaluating the fulfillment of the principles of collective action in practice: A case study from Galicia (NW Spain)," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:73:y:2016:i:c:p:1-9
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.08.002
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    1. Okumu, Boscow & Muchapondwa, Edwin, 2020. "Determinants of successful collective management of forest resources: Evidence from Kenyan Community Forest Associations," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    2. Rodríguez-Morales, Beatriz & Roces-Díaz, José V. & Kelemen, Eszter & Pataki, György & Díaz-Varela, Emilio, 2020. "Perception of ecosystem services and disservices on a peri-urban communal forest: Are landowners’ and visitors’ perspectives dissimilar?," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    3. Copena, Damián & Pérez-Neira, David & Macías Vázquez, Alfredo & Simón, Xavier, 2022. "Community forest and mushrooms: Collective action initiatives in rural areas of Galicia," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    4. María Bastida & Alberto Vaquero García & Miguel Á. Vázquez Taín, 2021. "A New Life for Forest Resources: The Commons as a Driver for Economic Sustainable Development—A Case Study from Galicia," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-17, January.

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